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“Forecast targeting,” forward-looking monetary policy that
uses central-bank judgment to construct optimal policy pro-
jections of the target variables and the instrument rate, may
perform substantially better than monetary policy that dis-
regards judgment and follows a given instrument rule. This
is demonstrated in a few examples for two empirical models
of the U.S. economy, one forward looking and one backward
looking. A complicated inﬁnite-horizon central-bank projec-
tion model of the economy can be closely approximated by a
simple ﬁnite system of linear equations, which is easily solved
for the optimal policy projections. Optimal policy projections
corresponding to the optimal policy under commitment in a
timeless perspective can easily be constructed. The whole pro-
jection path of the instrument rate is more important than the
current instrument setting. The resulting reduced-form reac-
tion function for the current instrument rate is a very complex
function of all inputs in the monetary-policy decision process,
including the central bank’s judgment. It cannot be summa-
rized as a simple reaction function such as a Taylor rule. For-
tunately, it need not be made explicit.
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On a general level, this paper is motivated by a desire to provide
a better theory of modern monetary policy, both from a descriptive
and a normative point of view, than much of the current literature
on monetary policy. The current literature to a large extent applies
a one-line modeling of monetary policy, such as when the instru-
ment rate is assumed to be a given function of a few variables—
for instance, “monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor
rule.”
I believe that the theory that I develop here is better from a
descriptive point of view, since it takes into account some crucial
aspects of monetary policy decisions, such as the collection, pro-
cessing, and analysis of large amounts of data, the construction of
projections of the target variables, the use of considerable amounts
of judgment, and the desire to achieve (mostly) relatively speciﬁc
objectives. The modern monetary policy process I have in mind can
be concisely described as “forecast targeting,” meaning “setting the
instrument rate such that the forecasts of the target variables look
good,” where “look good” refers to the objectives of monetary policy,
such as a given target for inﬂation and a zero target for the output
gap.1 I believe this view of the monetary policy process is also help-
ful from a normative point of view, for instance, in evaluating the
performance of and suggesting improvements to existing monetary
policy.2
On a more speciﬁc level, this paper is motivated by a de-
sire to demonstrate the crucial and beneﬁcial role of judgment—
information, knowledge, and views outside the scope of a particular
model—in modern monetary policy and, in particular, to demon-
strate that the appropriate use of good judgment can dramati-
cally improve monetary policy performance, even when compared to
1Bernanke (2004) discusses and compares forecast targeting (which he refers
to as “forecast-based policies”) and simple instrument rules (which he refers to as
“simple feedback policies”). He states that “the Federal Reserve relies primarily
on the forecast-based approach for making policy” and cites Greenspan’s (2004)
speech entitled “Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy” as evidence. He also
notes “that not only have most central banks chosen to rely most heavily on
forecast-based policies but also that the results, at least in recent years, have
generally been quite good, as most economies have enjoyed low inﬂation and
overall economic stability.”
2 See Svensson (2001a) and Svensson et al. (2002) for examples of evaluations
of monetary policy in New Zealand and Norway, respectively, with this perspec-
tive.
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policy that is optimal in all respects except for incorporating judg-
ment.3 As will be explained in detail below, judgment will be rep-
resented as the central bank’s conditional mean estimate of arbi-
trary multidimensional stochastic “deviations”—“add factors”—to
the model equations.4 I also wish to demonstrate the beneﬁts of
regarding the whole projection paths of the target variables rather
than forecasts at some speciﬁc horizon, such as eight quarters, as the
relevant objects in the monetary policy decision process. In particu-
lar, I believe that it is important to emphasize the whole projection
of future instrument rates rather than just the current instrument
rate. Furthermore, the modern view of the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy emphasizes that monetary policy actions have
eﬀects on the economy and the central bank’s target variables al-
most exclusively through the private-sector expectations of the fu-
ture paths of inﬂation, output, and interest rates that these actions
give rise to; therefore, monetary policy is really the management
of private-sector expectations (Woodford 2003a). From this follows
that eﬀective implementation of monetary policy requires the ef-
fective communication to the private sector of the central bank’s
preferred projections, including the instrument-rate projection. The
most obvious communication of these projections is to explicitly
announce and motivate them. Finally, I want to demonstrate the
beneﬁts of the approximation of inherently rather complex inﬁnite-
horizon central-bank projection models of the economy to much sim-
pler ﬁnite-horizon projection models that are much easier to use but
still arbitrarily close approximations to the inﬁnite-horizon models.
The decision process of modern monetary policy has several
distinct characteristics (see Brash 2000, Sims 2002, and Svensson
2001a):
3 Svensson (2003) also emphasizes the role of judgment in monetary policy but
does not provide any direct comparision of the performance of monetary policy
with and without judgment.
4 Svensson and Tetlow (2005) show how central-bank judgment can be ex-
tracted according to the method of optimal policy projections (OPP). This is a
method to provide advice on optimal monetary policy while taking policymakers’
judgment into account. An early version of the method was developed by Robert
Tetlow for a mostly backward-looking variant of the Federal Reserve Board’s
FRB/US model. The resulting projections have been referred to (somewhat mis-
leadingly) at the Federal Reserve Board as “policymaker perfect-foresight pro-
jections.” The paper demonstrates the usefulness of OPP with a few example
projections for two Greenbook forecasts and the FRB/US model.
4 International Journal of Central Banking May 2005
1. Large amounts of data about the state of the economy and
the rest of the world, including private-sector expectations and
plans, are collected, processed, and analyzed before each major
decision.
2. Because of lags in the transmission process, monetary policy
actions aﬀect the economy with a lag. For this reason alone,
good monetary policy must be forward looking, aim to in-
ﬂuence the future state of the economy, and therefore rely
on forecasts—projections. Central-bank staﬀ and policymak-
ers make projections of the future development of a number
of exogenous variables, such as foreign developments, import
supply, export demand, ﬁscal policy, productivity growth, and
so forth. They also construct projections of a number of en-
dogenous variables, quantities and prices, under alternative as-
sumptions, including alternative assumptions about the future
path of instrument rates. The policymakers are presented with
projections of the most important variables, including target
variables such as inﬂation and output, often under alternative
assumptions about exogenous variables and, in particular, the
instrument rate (such as the instrument rate being constant,
following market expectations, following some arbitrary reac-
tion function, or being optimal relative to a speciﬁc objective
function).
3. Throughout this process, a considerable amount of judgment is
applied to assumptions and projections. Projections and mone-
tary policy decisions cannot rely on models and simple observ-
able data alone. All models are drastic simpliﬁcations of the
economy, and data give a very imperfect view of the state of the
economy. Therefore, judgmental adjustments in both the use
of models and the interpretation of their results—adjustments
due to information, knowledge, and views outside the scope of
any particular model—are a necessary and essential component
in modern monetary policy.
4. Based on this large amount of information and analysis, the
policymakers decide on a current instrument rate, such that
the corresponding projections of the target variables look good
relative to the central bank’s objectives. Since the projections
of the target variables depend insigniﬁcantly on the current
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instrument-rate setting and mainly on the whole path of future
instrument rates, the policymakers, explicitly or implicitly, ac-
tually choose an instrument-rate projection—an instrument-
rate plan—and the current instrument-rate decision can be
seen as the ﬁrst element of that plan.
5. Finally, the current instrument rate is announced and imple-
mented. In many cases, the corresponding projections for in-
ﬂation and output or the output gap are also announced. In a
few cases, an instrument-rate projection is announced as well.5
This process makes the current instrument-rate decision a very
complex function of the large amounts of data and judgment that
have entered into the process. I believe that it is not very helpful
to summarize this function as a simple reaction function such as a
Taylor rule. Furthermore, the resulting complex reaction function is
a reduced form, which depends on the central bank’s objectives, its
view of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, the data the
central bank has collected, and the judgment it has exercised. It is
the endogenous complex result of a complex process. In no way is
this reaction function structural, in the sense of being invariant to
the central bank’s view of the transmission mechanism and private-
sector behavior, or the amount of information and judgmental ad-
justments. Still, much current literature treats monetary policy as
characterized by a given reaction function that is essentially struc-
tural and invariant to changes in the model of the economy. Treating
the reaction function as a reduced form is a ﬁrst step in a sensible
theory of monetary policy. But, fortunately, this complex reduced-
form reaction function need not be made explicit. It is actually not
needed in the modern monetary policy process.
However, there is a convenient, more structural representation
of monetary policy, namely in the form of a targeting rule, as advo-
cated recently in some detail in Svensson and Woodford (2005) and
Svensson (2003) and earlier (more generally) in Svensson (1999). An
optimal targeting rule is a ﬁrst-order condition for optimal monetary
policy. It corresponds to the standard eﬃciency condition of equality
between the marginal rates of substitution and the marginal rates of
5The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has published an instrument-rate projec-
tion for many years. The Bank of Norway is increasingly providing more infor-
mation about the future path of the instrument rate.
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transformation between the target variables, the former given by the
monetary policy loss function, the latter given by the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. An optimal targeting rule is invari-
ant to everything else in the model, including additive judgment and
the stochastic properties of additive shocks. Thus, it is a compact,
robust, and structural representation of monetary policy, and much
more robust than the optimal reaction function. A simple targeting
rule can potentially be a practical representation of robust monetary
policy, a robust monetary policy that performs reasonably well under
diﬀerent circumstances.6
Optimal targeting rules remain a practical way of representing
optimal monetary policy in the small models usually applied for aca-
demic monetary policy analysis. However, for the larger and higher-
dimensional operational macromodels used by many central banks
in constructing projections, the optimal targeting rule becomes more
complex and arguably less practical as a representation of optimal
monetary policy. In this paper, it is demonstrated that optimal policy
projections, the projections corresponding to optimal policy under
commitment in a timeless perspective, can easily be derived directly
with simple numerical methods, without reference to any optimal
targeting rule.7 For practical optimal monetary policy, policymak-
ers actually need not know the optimal targeting rule. They also
need not know any reaction function. They only need to ponder the
graphs of the projections of the target variables that are generated in
the policy process and choose the projections of the target variables
and the instrument rate that look best relative to the central bank’s
objectives.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out a reasonably
general inﬁnite-horizon model of the transmission mechanism and
the central bank’s objectives; deﬁnes projections, judgment, and op-
timal policy projections; and speciﬁes how the optimal policy can be
implemented and what information the private sector needs from the
6 McCallum and Nelson (2004) have recently criticized the advocacy of tar-
geting rules in Svensson (2003). Svensson (2004) rebuts this criticism and gives
references to a rapidly growing literature that applies targeting rules to monetary-
policy analysis. Walsh (forthcoming) shows a case of equivalence between target-
ing rules and robust control.
7 Nevertheless, a general form of an optimal targeting rule is derived in ap-
pendix F (available at www.ijcb.org), for the ﬁnite-horizon approximation of the
projection model.
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central bank. The section also presents a simple model of judgment,
when the deviation is a version of a ﬁnite-order moving average.
Then judgment can be seen as the accumulation of information over
time and allows for a recursive but high-dimensional representation
of the dynamics of the deviation and judgment. Finally, the section
represents the optimal policy projections as the solution to a some-
what complex system of diﬀerence equations, while taking judgment
into account. It also makes the point that, fortunately, the complex
reduced-form reaction function need not be made explicit. Section
2 presents a convenient ﬁnite-horizon model for the construction of
optimal policy projections, for both forward- and backward-looking
models. This ﬁnite-horizon model can be written as a simple ﬁnite
system of linear equations. Nevertheless, it is an exact or arbitrarily
close approximation to the inﬁnite-horizon model and is easily solved
for the optimal policy projections taking judgment into account. Sec-
tion 3 discusses and speciﬁes monetary policy that disregards judg-
ment and follows diﬀerent instrument rules, such as variants of the
Taylor rule or more complex instrument rules that are optimal in
the absence of judgment. Section 4 gives examples of and compares
monetary policy with and without judgment for two diﬀerent em-
pirical models of the U.S. economy: the backward-looking model of
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and the forward-looking New Key-
nesian model of Linde´ (2002). In these examples, monetary policy
with judgment results in substantially better performance than mon-
etary policy without judgment. This is also the case when monetary
policy without judgment is represented as a Taylor rule where the
instrument rate responds to forward-looking variables that incorpo-
rate private-sector judgment (although, as emphasized below, there
are serious principal and practical problems in implementing such
an instrument rule). Section 5 presents conclusions.
A separate and extensive appendix contains numerous technical
details.8 These include a general solution of the policy problem and
the related system of diﬀerence equations with forward-looking vari-
ables when the deviation is an arbitrary stochastic process; a spec-
iﬁcation of the model when the deviation and judgment are ﬁnite-
order moving-average processes and the application of the practical
method of Marcet and Marimon (1998) to that case; the precise
8 The appendix is available at www.ijcb.org.
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mathematical structure of the ﬁnite-horizon approximation model,
including the optimal targeting rule; and details on the empirical
backward- and forward-looking models.
1. A Model of the Policy Problem with Judgment
Consider the following linear model of an economy with a private
sector and a central bank,9 in a form that allows for both predeter-
mined and forward-looking variables as well as judgment:
 Xt+1
Cxt+1|t

 = A

Xt
xt

+ Bit +

zt+1
0

 . (1)
Here, Xt is a (column) nX -vector of predetermined variables (one
of these may be unity to conveniently incorporate constants in the
model) in period t; xt is an nx-vector of forward-looking variables;
it is an ni-vector of central-bank instruments (the forward-looking
variables and the instruments are the nonpredetermined variables);
zt is an exogenous nX -vector stochastic process and called the devi-
ation in period t; and A, B, and C are matrices of the appropriate
dimension. For any variable qt, I let qt+τ |t denote private-sector ex-
pectations of the realization in period t + τ of qt+τ conditional on
private-sector information available in period t. I assume that the
private sector has rational expectations, given its information.
For increased generality, the model is formulated in terms of an
arbitrary number of instruments, ni. In most practical applications,
monetary policy can be seen as having only one instrument—a short
interest rate, the instrument rate—so then ni = 1.
The upper block of (1) provides nX equations determining the
nX -vector Xt+1 in period t + 1 for given Xt, xt, it, and zt+1,
Xt+1 = A11Xt + A12xt + B1it + zt+1 (2)
where A and B are partitioned conformably with Xt and xt as
A ≡

A11 A12
A21 A22

 , B ≡

B1
B2

 . (3)
9 For simplicitly, there is no explicit ﬁscal authority in the model, but such
an authority and its behavior can be included in the model (1).
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The realization of the deviation and the predetermined variables in
each period occurs and is observed by the private sector and the
central bank in the beginning of the period (the realization of zt+1
can be inferred from Xt+1, Xt, xt and it and [2]).10
The lower block of (1) provides nx equations determining the
nx-vector xt in period t for given xt+1|t, Xt, and it,
xt = A−122 (Cxt+1|t −A21Xt −B2it); (4)
I hence assume that the nx×nx submatrix A22 is invertible. The re-
alization of Xt is observed by the private sector and the central bank
in the beginning of period t; the central bank then sets the instru-
ments, it; after observing the instruments, the private sector forms its
expectations, xt+1|t; and this ﬁnally determines the forward-looking
variables xt.
To assume that the deviation appears only in the upper block
of (1) is not restrictive. Suppose that I have a model where the
deviation appears in both blocks:

 Xot+1
Cxt+1|t

 =

Ao11 Ao12
Ao21 A
o
22



Xot
xt

+

Bo1
Bo2

 it +

zo1,t+1
zo2,t

 .
By adding the vector zot to the predetermined variables, I can always
form a new model of the form (1), where
Xt ≡

Xot
zo2t

 , A ≡


Ao11 0 A
o
12
0 0 0
Ao21 0 A
o
22

 , B ≡


Bo1
0
Bo2

 ,
zt ≡

zo1t
zo2

 ,
and there is no deviation in the lower block.
As in Svensson (2003), the deviation represents additional
determinants—determinants outside the model—of the variables in
10See Svensson and Woodford (2003) for an analysis of optimal policy in a
model with forward-looking variables when the current state of the economy is
imperfectly observed and inferred from observed indicators.
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the economy, the diﬀerence between the actual value of a variable
and the value predicted by the model. It can be interpreted as model
perturbations, as in the literature on robust control.11 The central
bank’s mean estimate of future deviations will be identiﬁed with
the central bank’s judgment. It represents the unavoidable judgment
always applied in modern monetary policy. Any existing model is
always an approximation of the true model of the economy, and
monetary policymakers always ﬁnd it necessary to make some judg-
mental adjustments to the results of any given model. Such judg-
mental adjustments could refer to future ﬁscal policy, productiv-
ity, consumption, investment, international trade, foreign-exchange
and other risk premia, raw-material prices, private-sector expecta-
tions, and so forth. The “add factors” applied to model equations in
central-bank projections (Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox 1997)
are an example of central-bank judgment. Given this interpretation
of judgment and the deviation zt+1, it would be completely mislead-
ing to make a simplifying assumption such as the deviation being a
simple autoregressive process. In that case, it could just be incorpo-
rated among the predetermined variables. Thus, I will refrain from
such an assumption and instead leave the dynamic properties of zt+1
unspeciﬁed, except in a special case when the deviation is a version
of a ﬁnite-order moving-average process. Generally, the focus will
be on the central bank’s judgment of the whole sequence of future
deviations.
More precisely, let the inﬁnite-dimensional period-t random vec-
tor ζt ≡ (z′t+1, z′t+2, ...)′ (where ′ denotes the transpose) denote the
vector of the (in period t) unknown random vectors zt+1, zt+2, ...
Let the central bank’s beliefs in period t about the random vector
ζt be represented by the inﬁnite-dimensional probability distribution
Φt with distribution function Φt(ζt). The probability distribution Φt
may itself be time-varying and stochastic. The central bank is as-
sumed to know the matrices A, B, C, D, and W and the discount
factor δ (D, W , and δ refer to the central bank’s objectives and are
deﬁned below). The private sector is assumed to know the matrices
A, B, and C, but may or may not know the central bank’s objectives
11See, for instance, Hansen and Sargent (1998). However, that literature deals
with the more complex case when the model perturbations are endogenous and
chosen by nature to correspond to a worst-case scenario.
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(that is, D, W , and δ). The private sector may or may not have the
same beliefs about the future deviations as the central bank.
Let Yt be an nY -vector of target variables. For simplicity, these
target variables are measured as the diﬀerence from a ﬁxed nY -vector
Y ∗ of target levels. This vector of target levels is held ﬁxed through-
out this paper. In order to examine the consequences of shifting
target levels, one only needs to replace Y t by Y t − Y ∗ throughout
the paper. Let the target variables be given by
Yt = D


Xt
xt
it

 (5)
where D is an nY × (nX + nx + ni) matrix.
Let the central bank’s intertemporal loss function in period t be
Et
∞∑
τ=0
δτLt+τ ≡
∫ ∞∑
τ=0
δτLt+τdΦt(ζt) (6)
where 0 < δ ≤ 1 is a discount factor, Lt is the period loss given by
Lt =
1
2
Y ′t WYt, (7)
and W is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite nY × nY matrix. That
is, in period t the central bank wants to minimize the expected dis-
counted sum of current and future losses, where the expectation Et
is with respect to the distribution Φt.
Since this is a linear model with a quadratic loss function and
the random deviations enter additively, the conditions for certainty
equivalence are satisﬁed. Then, as shown in detail in appendix A,
the optimal policy in period t need only consider central-bank
mean forecasts—projections—of all variables, including the inﬁnite-
dimensional mean forecast, zt, of the random vector ζt,
zt ≡ Etζt ≡
∫
ζtdΦt(ζt).
The central-bank projection in period t of the realization of the devi-
ation in period t+τ , zt+τ , is denoted zt+τ,t, so zt ≡ (z′t+1,t, z′t+2,t, ...)′.
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The projection zt is identiﬁed with the central bank’s judgment. Un-
der the assumed certainty equivalence, the projection zt is, for op-
timal policy, a suﬃcient statistic for the distribution Φt. Although
there is genuine uncertainty about the future random deviations, ζt,
the only thing that matters for policy is the mean, the judgment, zt.
The second and higher moments of ζt—the variance, skew, kurtosis,
and so forth—do not matter for policy.12 The judgment can itself
be seen as an exogenous inﬁnite-dimensional random vector that is
realized in the beginning of each period and summarizes the central
bank’s relevant information in that period about expected future
deviations.
Let qt ≡ (q′t,t, q′t+1,t, ...)′ denote a central-bank projection in pe-
riod t for any vector of variables qt+τ (τ ≥ 0) (with the exception
of εt and εt+τ ,t, to be introduced below), a central-bank mean fore-
cast conditional on central-bank information in period t. (Thus, for
variables other than the deviation, the projection also includes the
current value, qt,t = qt.) The central bank then constructs various
projections of the endogenous variables to be used in its decision pro-
cess. These projections of endogenous variables may be conditional
on various assumptions. In order to keep private-sector expectations
and central-bank projections conceptually distinct, I denote the for-
mer by qt+τ |t and the latter by qt+τ ,t for any variable qt.
For a given judgment, zt, the projection model of the central
bank for the projections (Xt, xt, it, Y t) in period t—the model the
central bank uses in the decision process to consider alternative
projections—will be
 Xt+τ+1,t
Cxt+τ+1,t

 = A

Xt+τ,t
xt+τ ,t

+ Bit+τ ,t +

zt+τ+1,t
0

 , (8)
Yt+τ,t = D


Xt+τ ,t
xt+τ,t
it+τ ,t

 (9)
for τ ≥ 0, where Xt,t satisﬁes
Xt,t = Xt, (10)
12 The variance of the future deviations will add a term to the intertemporal
loss, but that term is independent of policy.
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since the realization of the predetermined variables is assumed to be
observed in the beginning of period t.
In order to introduce more compact notation, let the (nX +nx +
ni)-vector st ≡ (X ′t, x′t, i′t)′ denote the state of the economy in pe-
riod t, and let the vector st+τ ,t ≡ (X ′t+τ ,t, x′t+τ,t, i′t+τ,t)′ denote the
projection in period t of the state of the economy in period t + τ .
Finally, let the inﬁnite-dimensional vector st ≡ (s′t,t, s′t+1,t, st+2,t, ...)′
denote a projection in period t of the (current and future) states of
the economy. By (9), I can write the projection of the target vari-
ables in a compact way, as a linear function of the projection of the
states of the economy, as
Y t = D˜st (11)
where D˜ is an inﬁnite-dimensional block-diagonal matrix with the
τ + 1-th diagonal block equal to D for τ ≥ 0.
The set of feasible projections of the states of the economy in
period t, St, can now be deﬁned as the set of projections st that
satisfy (8)–(10) for given Xt and zt.
The intertemporal loss function (6) with (7) induces an intertem-
poral loss function for the target-variable projection,13
L(Y t) ≡
∞∑
τ=0
δτY ′t+τ,tWYt+τ,t. (12)
The policy problem in period t is to ﬁnd the optimal policy pro-
jection (sˆt, Yˆ t), the projection that minimizes (12) over the set of
feasible projections of the states of the economy—that is, subject to
(8)–(11) for τ ≥ 0 for given Xt and zt. More compactly,
sˆt = arg min
st∈St
L(D˜st), (13)
Yˆ t ≡ D˜sˆ; and the optimal policy projection (Xˆt, xˆt, ıˆt) of the prede-
termined variables, forward-looking variables, and instruments can
be extracted from sˆt.
13 Note that minEt
∑∞
τ=0 δ
τ Lt+τ = min{L(Y t) + Et ∑∞τ=0 δτ (Yt+τ −
Yt+τ ,t)
′W (Yt+τ − Yt+τ ,t)} = min{L(Y t) +∑∞τ=0 δτ trace(WCovtYt+τ )}. By cer-
tainty equivalence, CovtYt+τ ≡ Et(Yt+τ − Yt+τ ,t)(Yt+τ − Yt+τ ,t)′ ≡
∫
(Yt+τ −
Yt+τ ,t)(Yt+τ − Yt+τ ,t)′dΦt(ζt) is independent of policy, so minimizing (12) in
period t implies the same policy as minimizing (6) in period t. Furthermore, note
that, since trace(WCovtYt+τ ) will normally be strictly positive, (6) will normally
converge only for δ < 1, whereas (12) will normally converge also for δ = 1.
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The policy problem will be further speciﬁed below to correspond
to commitment in a “timeless perspective,” in order to avoid any
time-consistency problems (see Woodford 2003b and Svensson and
Woodford 2005).
1.1 Implementation and What Information the Private Sector
Needs
The implementation of the optimal policy in period t involves an-
nouncing the optimal policy projection and setting the instruments
in period t equal to the ﬁrst element of the instrument projection,
it = ıˆt,t.
In period t+1, conditional on new realizations of the predetermined
variables, Xt+1, and the judgment, zt+1, a new optimal policy projec-
tion, (Xˆt+1, xˆt+1, ıˆt+1, Yˆ t+1), is found and announced together with
a new instrument setting,
it+1 = ıˆt+1,t+1.
In a forward-looking model, the private sector (including poli-
cymakers other than the central bank) will need to know at least
parts of the aggregate projections Xˆt, xˆt, and ıˆt, in order to make
decisions consistent with these and make the rational-expectations
equilibrium in the economy correspond to the central bank’s optimal
policy projection. If the private sector knows the matrices A, B, C,
D, and W and the discount factor δ and has the same judgment
zt as the central bank, it can in principle compute the optimal pol-
icy projection itself—assuming that it has the same computational
capacity as the central bank.
However, the private sector actually needs to know less. An as-
sumption maintained throughout this paper is that the private sector
knows the model (1), in the sense of knowing the matrices A, B, and
C. Furthermore, it observes Xt (determined by Xt−1, xt−1, and it−1
in period t − 1 and the realization of zt in the beginning of period
t according to [2]) in the beginning period t, then observes it = ıˆt,t
set by the central bank, thereafter forms one-period-ahead expec-
tations xt+1|t, and ﬁnally determines (and thereby knows) xt; after
this, period t ends. In order to make decisions in period t consis-
tent with the optimal policy projection—that is, decisions resulting
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in xt = xˆt,t from (4)—the private sector needs to be able to form
expectations xt+1|t = xˆt+1,t. The most direct way is if the central
bank announces xˆt+1,t and the private sector believes the announce-
ment. Formally, xˆt+1,t is the minimum additional information the
private sector needs. However, the central bank may have to provide
the whole optimal policy projection, and also motivate the under-
lying judgment, in order to demonstrate that the optimal policy
projections are internally consistent with the model (1). In particu-
lar, the private sector may not believe xˆt+1,t unless it is apparently
consistent with the whole projection ıˆt. Furthermore, the private
sector will need to know the central bank’s loss function—D, W ,
and δ—in order to judge whether the projections announced are re-
ally optimal relative to the central bank’s loss function and thereby
incentive-compatible, credible. Only then may the central bank be
able to convince the private sector to form expectations according
to the optimal policy projection.14 Indeed, the private sector com-
pletely trusting the central bank’s isolated announcement of xˆt+1,t
could invite misleading announcements, given the time-consistency
problem discussed below.15
1.2 Judgment as a Finite-Order Moving Average
Consider the special case when the deviation is a version of a moving-
average stochastic process with a given ﬁnite order T > 0 (where T
could be relatively large):
zt+1 = εt+1 +
T∑
j=1
εt+1,t+1−j (14)
where ε˜t ≡ (ε′t, εt
′
)′ ≡ (ε′t, ε′t+1,t, ..., ε′t+T,t)′ is a zero-mean iid random
(T +1)nX -vector realized in the beginning of period t and called the
14 Being explicit about the loss function and announcing the optimal policy
projection also seem to take care of the criticism of real-world inﬂation targeting
expressed by Faust and Henderson (2004).
15 See Geraats (2002) for such examples.
In a much noted contribution, Morris and Shin (2002) and Amato, Morris,
and Shin (2002) have emphasized the possibility that public information may
be bad and reduce social welfare by crowding out private information. Svensson
(2005) scrutinizes this result and shows that, in the model considered by Mor-
ris and Shin, public information actually increases social welfare for reasonable
parameters.
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innovation in period t.16 For T = 0, zt+1 is a simple iid disturbance.
For T > 0, the deviation is a version of a moving-average process.
It follows that the central-bank judgment zt+τ,t (τ ≥ 1) is also a
ﬁnite-order moving average and satisﬁes
zt+τ,t ≡ Etzt+τ =
T∑
j=τ
εt+τ,t+τ−j = εt+τ ,t
+
T∑
j=τ+1
εt+τ ,t+τ−j = εt+τ,t + zt+τ,t−1.
Hence, εt+τ ,t = zt+τ,t− zt+τ,t−1 can be interpreted as the innovation
in period t to the previous judgment zt+τ,t−1, the new information
the central bank receives in period t about the realization of zt+τ
in period t + τ . Hence, the judgment zt+τ,t in period t is the sum
of current and previous information about zt+τ . For horizons larger
than T , the central-bank judgment is constant and, without loss of
generality, equal to zero:
zt+τ,t = 0 (τ > T ). (15)
The dynamics of the deviation zt and the judgment zt+1 can then
be written as 
zt+1
zt+1

 = Az

zt
zt

+

 εt
εt+1

 (16)
where the (T + 1)nX × (T + 1)nX matrix Az is deﬁned as
Az ≡


0nX×nX InX 0nX×(T−1)nX
0(T−1)nX×nX 0(T−1)nX×nX I(T−1)nX
0nX×nX 0nX×nX 0nX×(T−1)nX


where 0m×n and Im denote an m×n zero matrix and an n×n identity
matrix, respectively. Thus, the dynamics of the deviation and the
judgment have a convenient linear and recursive representation.
16 Note that εt ≡ (ε′t+1,t , ε′t+2,t , ..., ε′t+T ,t)′ here denotes a random vector re-
alized in the beginning of period t and not the projection in period t of the
random variables εt+1, εt+2, ...,εt+T . That projection is always zero under the
above assumption of εt being a zero-mean iid random variable.
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The modeling of the dynamics of the deviation, zt, and the addi-
tive judgment, zt, in (16) allows for a relatively ﬂexible accumulation
of information about future deviations. Whereas the stochastic pro-
cess for the deviation is not a simple Markov process in terms of
itself, but a ﬁnite-order moving-average process, it can be written
as a higher-dimensional AR(1) process. The restriction imposed is
that the innovation is zero-mean and iid across periods. There is no
restriction of the variance and covariance of the elements of ε˜t within
the period. It follows that, for instance, εt+τ,t may have a variance
that is decreasing in τ , corresponding to a situation where there is
less information about the mean projection of deviations further into
the future; by assumption, there is no speciﬁc information about the
deviation for τ > T . For given t, there may be serial correlation
of εt+τ ,t across τ , corresponding to new information about serially
correlated future deviations.
1.3 Representing Optimal Policy Projections
Without the judgment terms (or, alternatively, with the deviation
being an iid zero-mean process or an autoregressive process with
iid shocks), the above inﬁnite-horizon linear-quadratic problem with
forward-looking variables is a well-known problem, examined and
solved in Backus and Driﬃll (1986), Currie and Levine (1993), and
So¨derlind (1999). The traditional way to ﬁnd a solution to this prob-
lem is to derive the ﬁrst-order conditions for an optimum and com-
bine the ﬁrst-order conditions with the model (1) to form a system of
diﬀerence equations with an inﬁnite horizon. The solution can then
also be expressed as a diﬀerence equation. Furthermore, Marcet and
Marimon (1998) have shown a new practical way of reformulating
the problem with forward-looking variables as a recursive saddle-
point problem (see appendix D).
A new element here is the solution with the judgment. For the
case when the deviation is a ﬁnite-order moving average, the dy-
namics of the deviation and the judgment, (16), can be incorporated
with (1), the vector of predetermined variables can be expanded to
include zt, and the standard solution can be applied directly.17 The
details for this case are provided in appendices C and D. When the
17 Since zt is incorporated in Xt, one does not need to add zt as a separate
predetermined variable.
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judgment is a realization of an inﬁnite-dimensional random vector,
the standard solution has to be modiﬁed to take that into account.
The details of that solution in the form of a diﬀerence equation are
explained in appendices A and B. Here I shall ﬁrst report the solu-
tion in the form of an inﬁnite-horizon diﬀerence equation and later
develop a very convenient ﬁnite-horizon version of the model.
Under the assumption of optimization under commitment, one
way to describe the optimal policy projection is by the following
diﬀerence equations,

xˆt+τ ,t
ıˆt+τ ,t

 = F


Xˆt+τ ,t
zt+τ ,t
Ξt+τ−1,t

 , (17)

Xˆt+τ+1,t
Ξt+τ,t

 = M


Xˆt+τ ,t
zt+τ,t
Ξt+τ−1,t

 (18)
for τ ≥ 0, where Xˆt,t = Xt. When the deviation is a ﬁnite-order mov-
ing average and the judgment is ﬁnite-dimensional, zt+τ,t denotes the
TnX -vector (z′t+τ+1,t, z′t+τ+2,t, ..., z′t+τ+T,t)
′, where zt+τ+j,t = 0 for
j+τ > T . When the judgment is inﬁnite-dimensional, zt+τ,t denotes
the inﬁnite-dimensional vector (z′t+τ+1,t, z′t+τ+2,t, ...)′. In the former
case, F and M are ﬁnite-dimensional matrices. In the latter case, F
and M include a linear operator R on zt+τ,t (an inﬁnite-dimensional
matrix) of the form
∑∞
j=0 Rjzt+1+τ+j,t, where {Rj}∞j=0 is a sequence
of matrices. The matrices F , M , and {Rj}∞j=0 depend on A, B, C,
D, W , and δ, but they are independent of the second and higher
moments of the deviation. The nX -vector Ξt+τ ,t consists of the La-
grange multipliers of the lower block of (8), the block determining
the projection of the forward-looking variables.
As discussed in appendix A, the value of the initial Lagrange
multiplier, Ξt−1,t, is zero, if there is commitment from scratch in
period t—that is, disregarding any previous commitments. This re-
ﬂects a time-consistency problem when there is reoptimization and
recommitment in later periods, as is inherently the case in practi-
cal monetary policy. Instead, I assume that the optimization is under
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commitment in a timeless perspective. Then, if the optimization, and
reoptimization, under commitment in a timeless perspective started
in an earlier period and has occurred since then, the initial value of
the Lagrange multiplier satisﬁes
Ξt−1,t = Ξt−1,t−1 (19)
where Ξt−1,t−1 denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the lower block of
(8) for the determination of xt−1,t−1 in the decision problem in pe-
riod t−1. The dependence of the optimal policy projection in period
t on this Lagrange multiplier from the decision problem in the previ-
ous period makes the optimal policy projection depend on previous
projections and illustrates the history dependence of optimal policy
under commitment in a forward-looking model shown in Backus and
Driﬃll (1986) and Currie and Levine (1993) and especially examined
and emphasized in Woodford (2003b).
It follows from (17)–(19) and (11) that the optimal policy pro-
jection of the states of the economy, the target variables, and the
instruments will be linear functions of Xt, zt, and Ξt−1,t−1, which
can be written in a compact way as
sˆt = H


Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1

 , Yˆ t = D˜H


Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1

 ,
ıˆt = Hi


Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1

 (20)
where H is an appropriately formed inﬁnite-dimensional matrix and
Hi is an inﬁnite-dimensional submatrix of H consisting of the rows
corresponding to the instruments. In particular, the instrument set-
ting in period t will be given by
it = ıˆt,t = h


Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1

 (21)
20 International Journal of Central Banking May 2005
where the ﬁnite- or inﬁnite-dimensional matrix h consists of the ni
ﬁrst rows of the matrix Hi.
As explained in Svensson and Woodford (2005), a simple way of
imposing the timeless perspective is to add a term to the intertem-
poral loss function (12),
L(Y t) + Ξt−1,t−1 1
δ
Cxt,t. (22)
In the policy problem in period t − 1, Ξt−1,t−1C can be interpreted
as the marginal loss in period t − 1 of a change in the one-period-
ahead projection of the forward-looking variables, xt,t−1. The time-
consistency problem arises from disregarding that marginal loss in
the policy problem in period t. Adding the corresponding term to
the loss function in period t as in (22) handles the time-consistency
problem, and the optimal policy under commitment in the timeless
perspective will result from minimizing (22) subject to (8)–(10) for
given Xt, zt, and Ξt−1,t−1.18 Since xt,t is an element of the projection
st, the optimal policy projection sˆt is then deﬁned as
sˆt = arg min
st∈St
{
L(D˜st) + Ξt−1,t−1 1
δ
Cxt,t
}
(23)
for given Xt, zt, and Ξt−1,t−1.
From (18) it follows that the Lagrange multiplier Ξt,t, to be used
in the decision problem in period t + 1, will be given by
Ξt,t = HΞ


Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1

 (24)
where HΞ is a ﬁnite- or inﬁnite-dimensional matrix.
18 Alternatively, as discussed in Giannoni and Woodford (2002) and Svensson
and Woodford (2005), one can impose the constraint
xt,t = Fx

 Xtzt
Ξt−1,t−1


where F in (17) is suitably partitioned. In the present context, it is more practical
to add the term to the intertemporal loss function as in (22).
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Let the set of feasible target-variable projections in period t, Yt,
be deﬁned as the set of target-variable projections satisfying (11)
for projections st in the set St for given Xt and zt. In the special
case where the forward-looking variables, xt, happen to be target
variables and elements in Yt, so xt,t is an element of Y t, the optimal
target-variable projection, Yˆ t, can be deﬁned as the target-variable
projection Y t that minimizes (22) on the set Yt, for given Xt, zt, and
Ξt−1,t−1,
Yˆ t = arg min
Y t∈Yt
{
L(Y t) + Ξt−1,t−1 1
δ
Cxt,t
}
.
However, in the more general case when some or all forward-looking
variables are not target variables, xt,t is not an element of Y t, and
the optimal policy projection has to be found by optimization over
the set St, as in (23).
1.4 Backward-Looking Model
In a backward-looking model, there are no forward-looking variables:
nx = 0. There is no lower block in (1) and (8), and there are no
forward-looking variables in (5) and (9). There are no projections
of forward-looking variables and Lagrange multipliers in (17), (18),
(20), and (21). There is no time-consistency problem and no need to
consider commitment in a timeless perspective.
Hence, for a backward-looking model, the optimal target-variable
projection can always be found by minimizing (12) over the set of
feasible target-variable projections,
Yˆ t = arg min
Y t∈Yt
L(Y t),
for given Xt and zt.
1.5 The Complex Reduced-Form Reaction Function Need Not
Be Made Explicit
The compact notation for the determination of the period-t instru-
ment it in (21) and the Lagrange multiplier Ξt,t in (24) may have
given the impression that optimal monetary policy is just a matter
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of calculating the ﬁnite- or inﬁnite-dimensional matrices h and HΞ
once and for all; then, in each period, ﬁrst observe Xt, form zt, and
recall Ξt−1,t−1 from last period’s decision; then simply compute, an-
nounce, and implement it from (21); and ﬁnally compute Ξt,t to be
used in next period’s decision.
This is a misleading impression, though. First, h and HΞ are
indeed high- or inﬁnite-dimensional and therefore diﬃcult to grasp
and interpret. Second, zt is also high- or inﬁnite-dimensional. It is
diﬃcult to conceive of policymakers or even staﬀ pondering pages
and pages, or computer screens and computer screens, of huge arrays
of numbers in small print, arguing and debating about adjustments
of the numbers of zt, such as the numbers in rows 220–250 and 335–
385. Third, no central bank (certainly no central bank that I have
any more thorough information about) behaves in that way, and is
ever likely to behave that way. Instead, the practical presentation
of information and options to policymakers is always in the form of
multiple graphs, modest-size tables, and modest amounts of text.
Fourth, the intertemporal loss function L(Y t) has the projections
of the target variables as its argument. What matters for the con-
struction of the target variables is the whole projection path of the
instruments, not the current instrument setting. The obvious con-
clusion is that the relevant objects of importance in the decision
process are the whole projection paths of the target variables and
the instruments, not the current instrument setting or projections of
the target variables at some ﬁxed horizon. These projection paths
are most conveniently illustrated as graphs. Indeed, graphs of pro-
jections are prominent in the existing monetary policy reports where
projections are reported. The analytical techniques discussed in this
paper should predominantly be seen as techniques for computer-
generated graphs of whole projection paths. Pondering such graphs
is an essential part of the monetary policy decision process. Impor-
tantly, policymakers need not know the underlying detailed high-
or inﬁnite-dimensional matrices behind the construction of those
graphs. Therefore, the complex reduced-form reaction functions em-
bedded in these matrices need not be made explicit.
Fifth, in the discussion in section 1.1, there was no reference to
the reaction function, only to the optimal policy projection. Given
Xt and it, the private sector needs to be able to form the expectations
xt+1|t in order to make decisions in period t. The minimum for this
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is the central bank’s announcement of xˆt+1,t. In order to make that
announcement credible, the central bank may have to announce the
complete optimal policy projection and motivate its judgment. But it
does not need to announce any reaction function. In principle, given
the reaction function, the private sector could combine the reaction
function with the model and solve for the optimal policy projection,
but that is an overwhelmingly complicated and roundabout way.
2. A Finite-Horizon Projection Model
Regardless of whether the judgment is ﬁnite- or inﬁnite-dimensional
(that is, whether [15] holds or not), the problem of minimizing the
intertemporal loss function is an inﬁnite-horizon problem. From a
practical and computational point of view, it is convenient to trans-
form the inﬁnite-horizon policy problem above to a ﬁnite-horizon
one. When the judgment satisﬁes (15), this can be done in a simple
and approximate, but arbitrarily close to exact, way for the forward-
looking model, and in a simple and exact way for the backward-
looking model. The ﬁnite-horizon model also makes it very easy to in-
corporate any arbitrary constraints on the projections—for instance,
a particular form of the instrument projection, such as a constant
instrument for some periods. Then, all the relevant projection paths
are computed in one simple step.
2.1 Forward-Looking Model
Suppose that the estimate of the deviation is constant beyond a ﬁxed
horizon T . Without loss of generality, assume that the constant is
zero.19 That is, I assume (15).
Start by writing the projection model (8) and (10) for τ =
0, ..., T − 1 as
Xt,t = Xt, (25)
19 If the estimate of the deviation from horizon T on is constant but nonzero,
it can be incorporated among other constants in the model. If the estimate of
the deviation from horizon T on is not constant but follows an autoregressive
process (for instance, if it is assumed to gradually approach a constant), it can
be incorporated among the predetermined variables.
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−A˜st+τ,t +

 Xt+τ+1,t
Cxt+τ+1,t

 =

zt+τ+1,t
0

 (τ = 0, ..., T − 1) (26)
where A˜ is the (nX+nx)×(nX+nx+ni) matrix deﬁned by A˜ ≡ [A B].
The ﬁrst nX equations of the last block of nX +nx equations in (26)
determine Xt+T,t for given Xt+T−1,t, xt+T−1,t, it+T−1,t, and zt+T,t.
The last nx equations of that block are
−A21Xt+T−1,t −A22xt+T−1,t −B2it+T−1,t + Cxt+T,t = 0.
They determine xt+T−1,t for given Xt+T−1,t and it+T−1,t, and, impor-
tantly, for given xt+T,t. A problem is that nx equations determining
xt+T,t are lacking. I will assume that xt+T,t is determined by the
assumption that xt+T+1,t is equal to its steady-state level. That is,
I assume that the optimal policy projection has the property that,
for (15), it approaches a steady state when T →∞. This is true for
the models and loss functions considered here. Without loss of gen-
erality, I assume that the steady-state values for the forward-looking
variables are zero,
xt+T+1,t = 0. (27)
From this it follows that Xt+T,t, xt+T,t, and it+T,t must satisfy
−A21Xt+T,t −A22xt+T,t −B2it+T,t = 0, (28)
which gives me the desired nx equations for xt+T,t.
Let st, the projection of the states of the economy, now
denote the ﬁnite-dimensional (T + 1) × (nX + nx + ni)-vector
st ≡ (s′t,t, s′t+1,t, ..., s′t+T,t)′. Similarly, let all projections qt for
q = X, x, i and Y now denote the ﬁnite-dimensional vector
qt ≡ (q′t,t, q′t+1,t, ..., q′t+T,t)′. Finally, let zt be the TnX -vector zt ≡
(z′t+1,t, z′t+2,t, ..., z′t+T,t)
′ (recall that zt does not include the compo-
nent zt).
The ﬁnite-horizon projection model for the projection of the
states of the economy, st, then consists of (25), (26), and (28). It
can be written compactly as
Gst = gt (29)
where G is the (T + 1)(nX + nx) × (T + 1)(nX + nx + ni) matrix
formed from the matrices on the left side of (25), (26), and (28), and
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gt is a (T + 1)(nX + nx)-vector formed from the right side of (25),
(26), and (28) as gt ≡ (X ′t, z′t+1,t, 0′, z′t+2,t, 0′, ..., z′t+T,t, 0′, 0′)′ (where
zeros denote zero vectors of appropriate dimension).
Since Y t now denotes the ﬁnite-dimensional (T + 1)nY -vector
Y t ≡ (Y ′t,t, Y ′t+1,t, ..., Y ′t+T,t)′, I can write
Y t = D˜st (30)
where D˜ now denotes a ﬁnite-dimensional (T +1)nY × (T +1)(nX +
nx + ni) block-diagonal matrix with the matrix D in each diagonal
block.
The set of feasible projections, St, is then deﬁned as the ﬁnite-
dimensional set of st that satisfy (29) and (30) for a given gt—that
is, for a given Xt and zt.
It remains to specify the intertemporal loss function in the
forward-looking model in the ﬁnite-horizon case. In the forward-
looking model, under assumption (15), the minimum loss from the
horizon T+1 on depends on the projection of the predetermined vari-
ables for period t + T + 1, Xt+T+1,t, and the Lagrange multipliers
Ξt+T,t according to the quadratic form
1
2
δT+1[X ′t+T+1,t Ξ
′
t+T,t
]V

Xt+T+1,t
Ξt+T,t


where V is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite matrix that depends
on the matrices A, B, C, D, and W and the discount factor δ (see
appendix A). It follows from (18) and (15) that this quadratic form
can be written as a function Xt+T,t and Ξt+T−1,t as20
1
2
δT+1[X ′t+T,t Ξ
′
t+T−1,t]M
′V M

 Xt+T,t
Ξt+T−1,t

 . (31)
In principle, I could use (18) to keep track of Ξt+T−1,t. However,
a simpler way is to extend the horizon T so far that Xt+T,t and
Ξt+T−1,t are arbitrarily close to their steady-state levels. Without
loss of generality, I assume that the steady-state levels are zero, in
20 The matrix M appearing in (31) is the matrix M in (18) with the columns
corresponding to zt deleted.
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which case the above quadratic form is zero, and the loss from hori-
zon T can be disregarded. Checking that Xt+T,t is close to zero is
straightforward; I will show a practical way to check that Ξt+T−1,t
is also close to zero.21
Under this assumption, it follows from (9), (12), and (30) that
the intertemporal loss function can be written as a function of st as
the ﬁnite-dimensional quadratic form
1
2
st
′
Ωst (32)
where Ω is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite block-diagonal (T +
1)(nX + nx + ni) matrix with its (τ + 1)-th diagonal block being
δτD′WD for 0 ≤ τ ≤ T . However, in order to impose the timeless
perspective, as explained in section 1.3, I need to add the term
Ξt−1,t−1
1
δ
Cxt,t
to the loss function, where Ξt−1,t−1 is the relevant Lagrange multi-
plier from the policy problem in period t−1. This term can be written
ω′t−1st, with the appropriate deﬁnition of the (T +1)(nX +nx +ni)-
vector ωt−1 as ωt−1 ≡ (0,′ 0′, (Ξt−1,t−1 1δC)′, 0′, ..., 0′)′ (where the ze-
ros denote zero vectors of appropriate dimension). Thus, the in-
tertemporal loss function with the added term is
1
2
st
′
Ωst + ω′t−1st. (33)
Then, the policy problem is to ﬁnd the optimal policy projec-
tion sˆt that minimizes (33) subject to (29). The Lagrangian for this
problem is
1
2
st
′
Ωst + ω′t−1st + Λ
t′(Gst − gt) (34)
where Λt is the (T + 1)(nX + nx)-vector of Lagrange multipliers of
(29). The ﬁrst-order condition is
st
′
Ω+ ω′t−1 + Λ
t′G = 0.
21 Appendix E presents an iterative numerical procedure that will provide a
projection arbitrarily close to the optimal policy projection without requiring
such a long horizon that Xt+T ,t and Ξt+T−1,t are close to their steady-state
levels.
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Combining this with (29) gives the linear equation system

G 0
Ω G′



st
Λt

 =

 gt
−ωt−1

 . (35)
The optimal policy projection sˆt and Lagrange multiplier Λt are
then given by the simple matrix inversion22

 sˆt
Λt

 =

G 0
Ω G′


−1 
 gt
−ωt−1

 . (36)
The optimal target-variable projection then follows from (30). The
optimal policy projection is a linear function of Xt, zt, and Ξt−1,t−1,
and it can be written compactly as in section 1.3:
sˆt = H


Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1

 , Yˆ t = D˜H


Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1

 ,
ıˆt = Hi


Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1

 ,
except that the matrices H and Hi and the vector zt now are ﬁnite-
dimensional. The matrices can be directly extracted from (36). The
period-t instrument setting can be written
it = ıˆt,t = h


Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1

 (37)
where the ﬁnite-dimensional matrix h consists of the ﬁrst ni rows
of the matrix Hi. Under assumption (15) and a suﬃciently long
22 Numerically, it is faster to solve the system of linear equations (35) by other
methods than ﬁrst inverting the left-side matrix (see Judd 1998).
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horizon T , the ﬁnite-horizon projections here are arbitrary close to
the optimal inﬁnite-horizon policy projections for τ = 0, ..., T in
section 1.3.
The Lagrange multiplier Λt can be written Λt ≡ (1δ ξ′t,t, ξ′t+1,t,Ξ′t,t,
δξ′t+2,t, δΞ′t+1,t, ..., δ
T ξ′t+T,t, δ
TΞ′t+T−1,t)
′, where ξt+τ,t is the vector of
Lagrange multipliers for the block of equations in (25), (26), and (28)
determining Xt+τ,t and Ξt+τ−1,t is the vector of Lagrange multipliers
for the block of equations determining xt+τ−1,t. Hence, extraction
of Ξt+T−1,t from Λt allows me to check that the assumption made
above of Ξt+T−1,t being close to zero is satisﬁed. If the assumption
is not satisﬁed, the horizon T can be extended until the assumption
is satisﬁed.23 Furthermore, Ξt,t can be extracted from Λt in order
to form the vector ωt to be used in the loss function for the policy
problem in period t + 1, to ensure the timeless perspective. The
Lagrange multiplier needed in the loss function in period t+ 1, Ξt,t,
can be written
Ξt,t = HΞ


Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1

 (38)
where the ﬁnite-dimensional matrix HΞ can be extracted from (36).
Again, as noted above in section 1.3, in spite of the compact
notation for the instrument it and Lagrange multiplier Ξt,t in (37)
and (38), these analytical techniques should predominantly be seen
as techniques for computer-generated graphs to be pondered by
the policymakers, and the matrices never need be made explicit to
the policymakers. Although the matrices are now formally ﬁnite-
dimensional, they are still high-dimensional and somewhat diﬃcult
to interpret.
2.2 Backward-Looking Model
Make the same assumption (15) as for the forward-looking model.
The projection in period t of the state of the economy in period t+τ ,
st+τ ,t, is now deﬁned as the (nX +ni)-vector st+τ,t ≡ (X ′t+τ ,t, i′t+τ,t)′
23 In practice, the horizon T is extended until the optimal projection sˆt is
insensitive to variations in T .
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for τ ≥ 0, in which case I can write, for the backward-looking model,
Xt+τ+1,t = A˜st+τ,t (τ ≥ T ). (39)
The projection model with horizon T can now be written
Xt,t = Xt, (40)
− A˜st+τ,t + Xt+τ+1,t = zt+τ+1,t (0 ≤ τ ≤ T − 1) (41)
where Xt and zt are given. The projection of the state of the economy,
st, is now a (T +1)(nX +ni)-vector. Then the projection model can
be written as (29), where G is a (T +1)nX× (T +1)(nX +ni) matrix
formed from the left side of (40) and (41), and gt is a (T+1)nX -vector
formed from the right side of (40) and (41) as gt ≡ (X ′t, zt
′
)′.
It is a standard result for a linear-quadratic backward-looking
model that the minimum loss from the horizon T +1 on depends on
the projection of the predetermined variables for period t + T + 1,
Xt+T+1,t, according to the quadratic form
1
2
δT+1X ′t+T+1,tV Xt+T+1,t (42)
where V is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite matrix that depends
on the matrices A, B, D, and W and the discount factor δ (see
appendix A). I could now (as for the forward-looking model) assume
that the predetermined variables approach a steady-state level for
large T , without loss of generality assume that the steady-state level
is zero, and extend the horizon T so far that the predetermined
variables are arbitrarily close to zero and the loss from period T on
is arbitrarily close to zero. I could then form the ﬁnite-horizon loss
function as for the forward-looking model, and this together with
(40) and (41) would form the ﬁnite-horizon model, which would be
an arbitrarily close approximation to the inﬁnite-horizon model for
suﬃciently large T .
However, the absence of the time-consistency problem and the
need to keep track of the Lagrange multiplier Ξt+T−1,t allows a simple
approach, which is exact also for small T , as long as assumption (15)
holds for that T . I follow this approach here.
From (39) it follows that the quadratic form (42) can be written
as a function of st+T,t as
1
2
δT+1s′t+T,tA˜
′V A˜st+T,t.
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The ﬁnite-horizon intertemporal loss function can then be written
1
2
T∑
τ=0
δτs′t+τ ,tD
′WDst+τ,t +
1
2
δT+1s′t+T,tA˜
′V A˜st+T,t.
The intertemporal loss function can now be written more compactly
as the quadratic form (32), where Ω now is a symmetric positive-
semideﬁnite block-diagonal (T+1)(nX+ni)-matrix, whose (τ+1)-th
diagonal block is δτD′WD for 0 ≤ τ ≤ T − 1 and whose (T + 1)-th
diagonal block now is δT (D′WD+ δA˜′V A˜). Thus, it diﬀers from the
matrix Ω for the forward-looking model by the addition of that last
term, 12δA˜
′V A˜.
The ﬁnite-horizon policy problem is now to ﬁnd the optimal
policy projection sˆt that minimizes (32) subject to (29), for given
gt, that is, for given Xt and zt. The corresponding optimal target-
variable projection Yˆ t then follows from (30).
The Lagrangian for this problem is
1
2
st
′
Ωst + Λt
′
(Gst − gt)
where Λt is a vector of Lagrange multipliers for (29). The ﬁrst-order
condition is
st
′
Ω+ Λt
′
G = 0.
Combining this with (29) gives the linear equation system
G 0
Ω G′



st
Λt

 =

gt
0

 .
The optimal policy projection sˆt is then given by the simple ma-
trix inversion, 
 sˆt
Λt

 =

G 0
Ω G′


−1 
gt
0

 . (43)
The optimal target-variable projection then follows from (30).
The optimal policy projection is obviously a linear function of Xt
and zt, and I can write
sˆt = H

Xt
zt

 , Yˆ t = D˜H

Xt
zt

 , ıˆt = Hi

Xt
zt


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where the ﬁnite-dimensional matrices H and Hi can be extracted
from (43). The instrument setting for period t can be written
it = ıˆt,t = h

Xt
zt

 (44)
where the ﬁnite-dimensional matrix h consists of the ﬁrst ni rows of
the matrix Hi.
2.3 Other Considerations
A ﬁnite-horizon projection model has several advantages. One is that
it is very easy to incorporate any restrictions on the projections. Any
equality restriction on Xt, xt, it, or Y t can be written
R¯st = s¯t (45)
where the number of rows of the matrix R¯ and the dimension of
the given vector s¯t equal the number of restrictions. This makes it
easy to incorporate any restriction on the instrument projection—
for instance, a restriction that it shall be constant or of a particular
shape for some periods.
Transforming the model into a ﬁnite system of equations may
be particularly practical from a computational point of view for a
nonlinear model. It may then also be easy to handle commitment in
a timeless perspective for a nonlinear model.
3. Monetary Policy Without Judgment
Modern monetary policy inherently relies, to a large extent, on judg-
ment. Previous sections of this paper have attempted to model this
dependence on judgment in a simple but speciﬁc way. This section
attempts to specify monetary policy without judgment, in order to
compare monetary policy with and without judgment.
There are several alternatives in modeling monetary policy with-
out judgment. Above, monetary policy with judgment has been mod-
eled as forecast targeting, ﬁnding an instrument projection such that
the corresponding projection of the target variables minimizes a loss
function. This procedure uses all information available to the central
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bank, including central-bank judgment. This results in a complex
reduced-form reaction function, which fortunately never needs to be
made explicit. When modeling monetary policy without judgment,
however, the most obvious route is to consider monetary policy as
a more mechanical process—a commitment to a particular reaction
function, a commitment to a particular instrument rule.24
Instrument rules can be divided into two categories: explicit in-
strument rules and implicit instrument rules (Svensson and Wood-
ford 2005; Svensson 2003). An explicit instrument rule is a reaction
function where the instrument responds to predetermined variables
only. Its implementation then consists of the central bank observ-
ing the predetermined variables in the beginning of the period, and
then calculating, announcing, and setting the instrument according
to this instrument rule. The implementation obviously requires that
the relevant predetermined variables must be observed by the central
bank, but since the predetermined variables in a particular period
are independent of the instrument setting in that period, no fur-
ther complications arise. An implicit instrument rule is a relation
between the current instrument and some of the current forward-
looking variables. Then, since the forward-looking variables depend
on the instrument setting, the instrument and the forward-looking
variables are simultaneously determined. Thus, an implicit instru-
ment rule is actually an equilibrium condition, a relation that holds
in equilibrium. The implementation of an implicit instrument rule
(that is, how to get to the desired equilibrium) is not trivial but a
complex issue. This fact has largely been overlooked in the literature,
except, for instance, in Svensson and Woodford (2005) and Svensson
(2003).
Here, I shall discuss how monetary policy without judgment can
be modeled as a commitment to an instrument rule—either an ex-
plicit instrument rule or an implicit instrument rule—with some dis-
cussion of the implementation of the latter. I will start from the
reduced-form reaction function for the instrument setting that fol-
lows from the forecast targeting modeled above. For simplicity, I
now consider the realistic case when there is only one instrument,
the instrument rate, so ni = 1.
24 This is an approach that a large part of the literature has taken—for instance,
most papers in the conference volume Taylor (1999). The approach is criticized
in Svensson (2003) and (2004).
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3.1 Explicit Instrument Rules
The construction of the optimal instrument projection, ıˆt, in the
forward-looking model results in an optimal reduced-form reaction
function for the current instrument setting, (37) (or [21]), which is
repeated here as
it = hXXt + hzzt + hΞΞt−1,t−1 (46)
where the row vector h is partitioned conformably with Xt, zt, and
Ξt−1,t−1 as h ≡ [hX hz hΞ] (h is now a row vector, since ni = 1). The
optimal reaction function implies a particular instrument response to
the predetermined variables, Xt; the judgment, zt; and the Lagrange
multiplier for the equations for xt−1,t−1 in the policy problem in
period t − 1, Ξt−1,t−1. The discussion here refers to the forward-
looking model; for the backward-looking model, I can simply delete
the term hΞΞt−1,t−1.
I want to model the central bank setting its instrument in a me-
chanical way, via a commitment to a particular instrument rule, while
disregarding judgment. Considering (46) as a potential instrument
rule, it is natural that disregarding judgment means that the central
bank behaves as if it believes that zt = 0 and hence disregards the
judgment term in (46), hzzt. Thus, monetary policy without judgment
is modeled as the central bank erroneously believing that the expected
future deviations equal zero—for instance, the central bank believing
that zt is a zero-mean iid process. A ﬁrst possibility is then that the
central bank also disregards the term with the Lagrange multiplier
from the previous policy problem. For one thing, if the central bank
did set the instrument mechanically in period t − 1 rather than by
explicit optimization, it may not be aware of the Lagrange multiplier
and its value. This leaves responding to the current predetermined
variables only,
it = hXXt. (47)
Such a policy would be ineﬃcient for two reasons, even if the
response coeﬃcients to Xt are those of the optimal reaction func-
tion (46). First, it disregards judgment, the term hzzt. Second, it
also disregards the response to lagged predetermined variables im-
plied by the response to the Lagrange multiplier, Ξt−1,t−1, as indi-
cated in (19). Indeed, optimization under discretion would result in a
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reduced-form reaction function where the instrument responds only
to the current predetermined variables.25
The response to the Lagrange multipliers in (46) implies a re-
sponse to lagged predetermined variables. Disregarding judgment,
the Lagrange multiplier in (38) (or [24]) follows
Ξt−1,t−1 = HΞXXt−1 + HΞΞΞt−2,t−2
=
∞∑
j=0
HjΞΞHΞXXt−1−j
where HΞ is partitioned conformably with Xt, zt, and Ξt−1,t−1 as
HΞ ≡ [HΞX HΞz HΞΞ]. A second possibility for policy disregarding
judgment is then that the policy responds with the optimal coeﬃ-
cients hΞ to these lagged predetermined variables, resulting in the
reaction function
it = hXXt + hΞ
∞∑
j=0
HjΞΞHΞXXt−1−j . (48)
This would seem to be an instrument rule corresponding to a rather
sophisticated policy, commitment to the reaction function resulting
from optimal policy under commitment in a timeless perspective,
while disregarding judgment.26
25 The resulting reduced-form reaction function resulting from optimization
under discretion would have diﬀerent coeﬃcients than the optimal hX . Because
of this, and because of the missing response to lagged predetermined variables,
the response is suboptimal and results in so-called stabilization bias relative to
the commitment policy (Svensson and Woodford 2005).
Given a particular restricted class of instrument rules—for instance, simple
instrument rules with only a few arguments—one can ﬁnd the optimal instrument
rule in that restricted class (see appendix G). The optimal instrument rule in a
restricted class will depend on the stochastic properties of the disturbances to
the economy. Many papers of Taylor (1999) provide examples of such optimal
restricted instrument rules.
26 Note that only if hΞ is invertible can this be written on the “instrument
smoothing” form
it = hXXt + hΞHΞXXt−1 + hΞHΞΞh
−1
Ξ hΞ
∞∑
j=0
HjΞΞHΞXXt−1−j
= hXXt + hΞHΞXXt−1 + hΞHΞΞh
−1
Ξ (it−1 − hXXt−1)
= hXXt + hΞ(HΞX −HΞΞh−1Ξ hX )Xt−1 + hΞHΞΞh−1Ξ it−1.
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3.2 Implicit Instrument Rules
Another apparent possibility would be an implicit instrument rule,
where the instrument responds to the forward-looking variables, xt.
This might seem advantageous, since, in a rational-expectations equi-
librium, the forward-looking variables might be aﬀected by private-
sector expectations of future deviations. Then, by responding to
forward-looking variables, the central bank might indirectly take
judgment into account—although, in this case, private-sector judg-
ment. Thus, one might want to consider an ad hoc implicit instru-
ment rule of the form
it = fXXt + fxxt (49)
where fX and fx are row vectors of given response coeﬃcients.
As mentioned above, however, there is a speciﬁc problem with
the central bank responding to forward-looking variables, something
largely overlooked in the literature (except, for instance, Svensson
and Woodford 2005 and Svensson 2003). Since the forward-looking
variables depend on the central bank’s instrument setting, a simul-
taneity problem arises. The central bank cannot observe the forward-
looking variables before it sets the instrument, and the private sec-
tor needs to observe the instrument setting before it determines the
forward-looking variables. A relation such as (49) is actually an equi-
librium condition, where it and xt are simultaneously determined.
The implementation of such an equilibrium condition is not straight-
forward.
A sophisticated way to implement (49) is for the central bank to
construct projections (Xt, xt, it) that satisfy (49). The central bank
can amend the relation
it+τ,t = fXXt+τ ,t + fxxt+τ,t (50)
for τ ≥ 0 to its projection model (29) (or [28]). It can then solve
for the projection (X˜t, x˜t, ı˜t) for given Xt, disregarding the judgment
(setting zt+τ,t = 0 for τ ≥ 1). These projections will by construction
If there is only one instrument, hΞ is invertible only if Ξt−1,t−1 is a scalar—that
is, if there is only one forward-looking variable. The point is that the optimal
reaction function under commitment usually cannot be written as an instrument
rule involving current predetermined variable and the lagged instrument, unless
it−1 happens to be one of the predetermined variables.
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satisfy (50). The corresponding instrument setting, it = ı˜t,t, will then
be a linear function of Xt,
it = f˜XXt. (51)
The central bank can then set this instrument level according to the
reduced-form reaction function (51).27
However, if the private sector understands that the central bank
is eﬀectively implementing the reaction function (51); has rational
expectations of future variables; and, in particular, has expecta-
tions of future nonzero deviations, zt+τ |t = 0 (τ ≥ 1); the resulting
market-determined forward-looking variables, xt, will deviate from
the central-bank projection, x˜t,t. Thus, although the instrument set-
ting will satisfy
it = fXXt + fxx˜t,t
for the central-bank projection x˜t,t, it will not satisfy (49) for the
market-determined forward-looking variables xt.
For relation (49) to be satisﬁed for the market-determined
forward-looking variables, the central bank has to amend the re-
lation (50) for τ ≥ 0 to its production model (29) (or [28]) and solve
27 In the context of the ﬁnite-horizon projection model, relation (50) can be
written as (T + 1)ni equations,
R¯st = 0,
where R¯ is an (T + 1)ni × (T + 1)(nX + nx + ni) matrix. Combining these with
(29) for zt = 0 gives an equation system
[
G
R¯
]
st =
[
g˜t
0
]
where g˜t is the (T +1)(nX +nx)-vector (X
′
t , 0
′)′. Under the assumption that the
matrix on the left side has full rank, st is given by
s˜t ≡
[
G
R¯
]−1 [
g˜t
0
]
. (52)
This results in
x˜t,t = H˜x0Xt
where the matrix H˜x0 can be extracted from the right side of (52) and
ı˜t,t = fXXt + fx x˜t,t = (fX + fxH˜x0)Xt ≡ f˜XXt.
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for the projection (Xt, xt, xt) for given Xt, taking the judgment into
account.28 This results in
xt,t = H˜xX0Xt + H˜xz0zt
it,t = fXXt + fxxt,t = (fX + fxH˜xX0)Xt + fxH˜xz0zt
≡ f˜XXt + f˜zzt.
Thus, the resulting reduced-form reaction function is
it = f˜XXt + f˜zzt.
If the private sector understands that this is the reaction function fol-
lowed by the central bank and has rational expectations correspond-
ing to the same judgment, the market-determined forward-looking
variables, xt, will equal the central-bank projection, xt,t, and the
relation (49) will be satisﬁed in equilibrium.
This is, of course, an example of a central bank explicitly taking
judgment into account, not an example of a central bank disregard-
ing judgment. But instead of ﬁnding the optimal policy projection,
(Xˆt, xˆt, ıˆt, Yˆ t), that minimizes its loss function, it ﬁnds the projec-
tion (Xt, xt, it, Y t) that satisﬁes the ad hoc relation (49). Since the
latter is no easier than the former and, in particular, suboptimal,
this behavior seems a bit far-fetched.
Thus, I can model monetary policy without judgment as follow-
ing either the explicit instrument rule (47), where both judgment
28 The equation system is then[
G
R
]
st =
[
gt
0
]
where gt is the (T + 1)(nX + nx)-vector (X
′
t , zt,t
′, 0′, z′t+1,t , 0
′, ..., z′t+T ,t, 0
′, 0′)′
speciﬁed in section 2.1. Under the assumption that the matrix on the left side
has full rank, st is given by
st =
[
G
R
]−1 [
gt
0
]
. (53)
This results in
xt,t = H˜xX0Xt + H˜xz0z
t
where H˜xX0 and H˜xz0 can be extracted from the right side of (53) and
it,t = fXXt + fxxt,t = (fX + fxH˜x0)Xt + fxH˜xz0z
t ≡ f˜XXt + f˜zzt .
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and lagged predetermined variables are ignored, or the more sophis-
ticated explicit instrument rule (48), or perhaps some intermediate
case of (48) where the summation is over a ﬁnite past period. Us-
ing the implicit instrument rule (49) is somewhat problematic, since
its implementation is complex and open to alternative very diﬀerent
interpretations, with very diﬀerent resulting equilibria.
3.3 Taylor Rules
In the literature, a number of simple ad hoc instrument rules have
been used to discuss and evaluate monetary policy. The most com-
mon are variants of the Taylor rule.29 One variant of the Taylor rule
with instrument smoothing (meaning, in this context, a response to
the lagged instrument rate) is
it = (1− fi)(fππt + fyyt) + fiit−1
where πt denotes a measure of the diﬀerence of inﬂation from a
given inﬂation target; yt denotes a measure of the output gap; fπ
and fy are given positive coeﬃcients that can be interpreted as the
long-run response to inﬂation and the output gap, respectively; and
the coeﬃcient fi satisﬁes 0 ≤ fi ≤ 1. If inﬂation and the output
gap are predetermined, this is an explicit instrument rule, and its
implementation only requires that the central bank can observe or
estimate current inﬂation and the output gap. If inﬂation and/or the
output gap are forward-looking variables, this is an implicit instru-
ment rule, where the instrument and the forward-looking variable
are simultaneously determined. As noted above, such an instrument
rule is somewhat problematic and its implementation may need to
be further speciﬁed.
One variant of the Taylor rule, a so-called forecast-based or
forward-looking Taylor rule, can be written
it = (1− fi)[fππt+J,t + fyyt+K,t] + fiit−1
where πt+J,t denotes a projection of the diﬀerence of inﬂation from
an inﬂation target at horizon J ≥ 0 and yt+K,t denotes a projection
of the output gap at horizon K ≥ 0, where at least one of J or K is
29 Kozicki (1999) provides a discussion of the usefuleness of Taylor rules.
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positive. Such an instrument rule is an explicit or an implicit instru-
ment rule depending on how the projections are constructed. If the
projections are constructed with information that is predetermined
in period t, the projections are predetermined and the instrument
rule is explicit. If the projections are constructed with information
that includes simultaneously determined forward-looking variables,
the instrument rule is implicit and hence an equilibrium condition.
Again, the implementation of such an instrument rule is not trivial
and open to alternative interpretations.30
4. Examples
In this section, I discuss examples of monetary policy with and with-
out judgment in two diﬀerent empirical models of the U.S. economy:
a backward-looking model due to Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)
and a forward-looking model due to Linde´ (2002).
4.1 Backward-Looking Model
The backward-looking empirical model of Rudebusch and Svensson
(1999) has two equations (with estimates rounded to two decimal
points):
πt+1 = 0.70πt − 0.10πt−1 + 0.28πt−2 + 0.12πt−3 + 0.14 yt + zπ,t+1
(54)
yt+1 = 1.16 yt− 0.25 yt−1− 0.10
(
1
4
Σ3j=0it−j −
1
4
Σ3j=0πt−j
)
+ zy,t+1.
(55)
The period is a quarter, πt is quarterly gross domestic product in-
ﬂation measured in percentage points at an annual rate, yt is the
output gap measured in percentage points, and it is the quarterly
average of the federal funds rate, measured in percentage points at
an annual rate. All variables are measured as diﬀerences from their
means, their steady-state levels. The deviations zπ,t+1 and zy,t+1 for
inﬂation and the output gap have been substituted for the shocks
30 Svensson (2001c) discusses additional serious problems with forecast-based
instrument rules.
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of the original Rudebusch-Svensson model. The predetermined vari-
ables are (πt, πt−1, πt−2,πt−2, yt, yt−1, it−1, it−2,it−3). See appendix H
for details.
The target variables are inﬂation, the output gap, and the ﬁrst-
diﬀerence of the federal funds rate. The period loss function is
Lt =
1
2
[
π2t + λy
2
t + ν(it − it−1)2
]
(56)
where πt is measured as the diﬀerence from the inﬂation target,
which is equal to the steady-state level. The discount factor, δ, and
the relative weights on the output-gap stabilization, λ, and interest-
rate smoothing, ν, are set so δ = 1, λ = 1, and ν = 0.2.
Let me emphasize that there may be considerable uncertainty
about the future deviations, ζt, in this case {zπ,t+τ , zy,t+τ}∞τ=1. Con-
sider a simple case, when the distribution Φt is such that there is
uncertainty only about zπ,t+τ and only for a ﬁnite number of quar-
ters, 1 ≤ τ ≤ T . Then, I can take ζt to be the random T -vector
ζt = (zπ,t+1, ..., zπ,t+T ). Suppose furthermore that there are only
four possible events with realizations ζt(j) (j = 1, 2, 3, 4), and that
these are as follows:
1. With probability 0.4, ζt(1) = (0, 0, ...)′, no deviation.
2. With probability 0.3, ζt(2) = (0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0, ...)′, a short
sequence of large “cost-push” shocks.
3. With probability 0.2, ζt(3) = (0, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0, ...)′, a long
sequence of small cost-push shocks.
4. With probability 0.1, ζt(4) = (0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0, ...)′, a long
sequence of large cost-push shocks.
The resulting judgment is the mean of the future deviations, the
T -vector zt = 0.4 ζt(1)′ + 0.3 ζt(2)′ + 0.2 ζt(3)′ + 0.1 ζt(4)′ =
(0, 0.44, 0.44, 0.14, 0.14, 0, ...)′.
Note that the same judgment arises if the probabilities are the
same for the four events but the ﬁrst event is that all components
τ = 1, ..., T of ζt have independent uniform distributions between
−1 and 1; the second event is that all components have the same
distributions as for the ﬁrst event except that components τ = 2
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Figure 1. Monetary Policy with and without Judgment:
Backward-Looking Model
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and 3 have independent uniform distributions between 0 and 2; the
third event is that all components have the same distributions as
for the ﬁrst event except that components τ = 2, 3, 4, and 5 have
independent uniform distributions between −0.8 and 1.2; and the
fourth event is that all components have the same distribution as
for the ﬁrst event except that component τ = 2, 3, 4, and 5 have
independent uniform distributions between 0 and 2. Thus, behind a
given judgment vector can be a distribution Φt involving considerable
uncertainty. Still, only the mean of that distribution matters.
Figure 1 shows a situation where the predetermined variables,
inﬂation and the output gap, and the deviations are assumed to
have been equal to their steady-state levels, zero, up to quarter 0.
Furthermore, in previous quarters, the central bank’s judgment, zt
(t < 0), has been zero: The central bank’s expected future inﬂation
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and output-gap deviations have been zero (although possibly with
large variances).
In panel a, the central bank’s judgment in quarter 0, z0, changes
from that in previous quarters, such that the central bank’s expected
inﬂation deviation equals 1 percentage point for quarter 6, whereas
it is still zero in all other quarters; the expected output-gap devia-
tion is still zero for all quarters.31 Again, behind these means may
be a distribution Φ0 corresponding to considerable uncertainty. The
expected inﬂation deviation, denoted zπ, is marked by circles with
no connecting line. The panel shows the optimal policy projection
in quarter 0, (π0, y0, i0, r0), of inﬂation, π (the dashed line); the out-
put gap, y (the dashed-dotted line); the instrument rate, i (the solid
line); and the short real interest rate, r (the dotted line).32
Panel a has two main interpretations. The ﬁrst interpretation is
that the panel just shows the judgment z0 and the optimal policy
projection (πˆ0, yˆ0, ıˆ0, rˆ0) in quarter t = 0 for the future quarters
τ ≥ 1 and thereby the realization of z0, πˆ0, yˆ0, ıˆ0, and rˆ0 in quarter 0.
Conditional on the actual realization of π1 and y1 (in turn, depending
on the realization of zπ1 and zy1) and the realization of z1 in quarter
t = 1, a new optimal policy projection (πˆ1, yˆ1, ıˆ0, rˆ0) has to be plotted
in quarter 1 for future quarters τ ≥ 2), and so forth for t = 2, 3, ...
The second interpretation is that the panel shows the probability-
zero event that the future realizations of the random deviation zt
for t ≥ 1 are exactly equal to the judgment z0 in quarter 0. That
is, the realizations of zπt for t ≥ 1 are zero, except in quarter 6
when it is 1 percentage point, and the realizations of zyt for t ≥ 1
are all zero. In this interpretation, the panel also shows the opti-
mal policy projection (πˆt, yˆt, ıˆt, rˆt) for each quarter t ≥ 1. These
optimal policy projections are then simply the continuation of the
optimal policy projection of the previous quarter. Furthermore, the
actual future realization of inﬂation, the output gap, the instrument
rate, and the real interest rate are then equal to the previous optimal
policy projections.
Thus, in the ﬁrst interpretation, panel a just shows a particular
realization of the judgment z0 and the corresponding optimal pol-
icy projection (πˆ0, yˆ0, ıˆ0, rˆ0). In the second interpretation, panel a in
31 In terms of the modeling of the deviation as a moving average process in
section 1.2, panel a shows the impulse response to ε0.
32 The short real interest rate is deﬁned as rt ≡ it − πt+1|t.
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addition shows a time series of a particular realization of the future
deviation—namely the realization that is exactly equal to the judg-
ment in quarter 0—as well as the resulting realizations over time
of inﬂation, the output gap, the instrument rate, and the real in-
terest rate. Clearly, the probability of the future realizations of the
deviation being exactly equal to the previous judgment is generally
zero.
Panel a shows that when the central bank expects a 1 percent-
age point inﬂation deviation in quarter 6, it chooses an optimal
instrument-rate projection such that the instrument rate is raised
to about 1 percentage point during the ﬁrst few quarters and then
gradually lowered back to its steady-state level. As a result, the pro-
jected output gap gradually falls to about −0.5 percentage points
in quarter 7 and then very gradually rises back towards zero. The
inﬂation projection shows inﬂation falling slightly before it is hit by
the inﬂation-deviation in quarter 6, then rising to almost 1 percent-
age point, and ﬁnally falling back towards its steady-state level after
quarter 6. Thus, the optimal policy projection is a clear example of
preemptive monetary policy: the instrument rate is raised and the
output gap is reduced well before the expected inﬂation-deviation
shock, so as to eﬃciently control inﬂation and bring it back to target
after the shock. The optimal policy projection in quarter 0 results
in an intertemporal loss of 2.1 units.33 In the second interpretation,
when panel a shows the actual realization of the deviation, the ac-
cumulated realized loss over time, discounted to quarter 0, is also
the same 2.1 units (since δ = 1, the discounting does not aﬀect the
loss).
Panel b shows the time series of the variables for the same par-
ticular realization of the future deviations when the inﬂation devi-
ation equals 1 percentage point in quarter 6 and is zero elsewhere.
However, in this panel, the central bank in each quarter disregards
judgment, while still responding optimally to the predetermined vari-
ables. That is, the central bank responds in the same way to the
predetermined variables as for the optimal policy, but it does not
respond to any expected future deviation. It behaves as if it believes
33 Given how the target variables are measured, with the loss function (56)
and δ = 1, an expected diﬀerence of inﬂation from target of one (two) annualized
percentage point(s) for a single quarter gives rise to an intertemporal loss of one
(four) units.
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that the deviation is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean process, so
its expected future deviations are zero. This corresponds to a com-
mitment to the instrument rule (47) (recall that there is no optimal
response to Lagrange multipliers or lagged predetermined variables
for the backward-looking model). The central bank then keeps the
instrument rate at its steady-state level through quarter 5. Accord-
ingly, inﬂation and the output gap stay at the steady-state levels
through quarter 5. In quarter 6, the inﬂation shock hits and inﬂa-
tion jumps to 1 percentage point, while the predetermined output
gap still stays at zero. In this situation, once the inﬂation shock
has hit, the optimal monetary policy response is to raise the instru-
ment rate substantially, to more than 1.5 percentage points above the
steady-state level during the following few quarters. This reduces the
output gap to almost −0.5 percentage points during the next eight
to nine quarters. The instrument rate is gradually lowered back to
the steady-state level, and inﬂation and the output gap return to
their steady-state levels very slowly. The absence of any preemption
requires a larger instrument-rate response when the shock occurs,
the output-gap is nevertheless reduced with a considerable lag, and
inﬂation stays above target for a long time. The resulting intertem-
poral loss is 3.2 units, 1.1 units higher than when monetary policy
relies on judgment.
Panel c is analogous to panel a, except that it shows a situ-
ation when the central bank’s judgment in quarter 0, z0, is such
that the central bank expects an output-gap deviation of 1 per-
centage point in quarter 6, whereas no other deviations are ex-
pected. The expected output-gap deviation, zy, is denoted by cir-
cle markers with no connecting line. Again, panel c has two in-
terpretations: the ﬁrst is that the panel just shows the judgment
and optimal policy projection in quarter 0; the second is that it
also shows the time series of the variables if the future realizations
of the output-gap deviation are exactly equal to the judgment in
quarter 0. For this expected output-gap deviation, the optimal pol-
icy projection shows a substantial increase in the instrument rate
to almost 2 percentage points above the steady-state level in quar-
ters 3–5 and then a rather quick reduction back to the steady-state
level. As a result, the output-gap projection shows output falling by
almost −0.5 percentage points before the expected output-gap de-
viation hits, after which it rises to less than 0.5 percentage points
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and then relatively quickly comes back to the steady-state level. The
resulting movements in the inﬂation projection are small. A mod-
est loss of 0.51 units results from this preemptive optimal policy
projection.
Panel d is analogous to panel b, except that it shows the time
series of the variables for the particular realization of the output-
gap deviation when it equals 1 percentage point in quarter 6 and
is zero in the other quarter. The central bank disregards judgment
and only responds to current and lagged inﬂation and the output gap
(although, again, optimally so, according to the instrument rule [47]).
Then the central bank keeps the instrument rate at its steady-state
level until the output-gap shock hits in quarter 6. Once the shock
has hit, it is optimal to raise the instrument rate even more, to more
than 2 percentage points for a few quarters, before it is lowered
back to the steady-state level. The output gap stays up around 1
percentage point for several quarters. This causes inﬂation to rise and
only very slowly return to target. The output gap has to undershoot
the steady-state level signiﬁcantly in order to bring inﬂation back.
Clearly, inﬂation and the output gap deviate substantially more than
when the central bank uses its judgment. The resulting intertemporal
loss is 3.1 units, 2.6 units higher than the loss for the optimal policy
projection with judgment.
This example shows a substantial diﬀerence between monetary
policy with and without judgment, with substantial diﬀerences in the
development of the target variables and corresponding intertemporal
losses.
4.2 Forward-Looking Model
The forward-looking New Keynesian model of Linde´ (2002) has two
equations. I use the following parameter estimates:
πt = 0.457πt+1|t + (1− 0.457)πt−1 + 0.048yt + zπt,
yt = 0.425 yt+1|t + (1− 0.425)yt−1 − 0.156(it − πt+1|t) + zyt.
The variables are measured as for the backward-looking model. The
predetermined variables are (πt−1, yt−1, it−1, zπt, zyt) (the lagged in-
strument rate enters because it enters into the loss function, and the
two deviations are entered in order to write the model on the form
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Figure 2. Monetary Policy with and without Judgment:
Forward-Looking Model
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[1]; see section 1). The forward-looking variables are (πt, yt). See ap-
pendix I for details. The loss function and its parameters used in the
experiment below are the same as for the backward-looking model.34
Figure 2, panels a–d, shows the same experiments as ﬁgure 1, but
for the forward-looking model. Thus, before quarter 0, the variables
are equal to their steady-state levels, zero, and the central bank does
not expect any future inﬂation and output-gap deviations.
In panel a, in quarter 0, while the inﬂation and the output-gap
deviations in that quarter are still zero, the central bank’s judgment,
34 I ﬁnd it very unrealistic to consider inﬂation and output in the current quar-
ter as forward-looking variables. I believe it makes more sense to have current
inﬂation and the output gap predetermined, and to have one-quarter-ahead inﬂa-
tion, output-gap, and instrument-rate plans be determined by the model above.
Such a variant of the New Keynesian model is used in Svensson and Woodford
(2005) and Svensson (2003).
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z0, changes, such that the central bank expects an inﬂation devia-
tion equal to 1 percentage point in quarter 6, whereas it still expects
zero inﬂation deviations for all other quarters and zero output-gap
deviations for all quarters. Again, behind these expected deviations
could be a probability distribution Φ0 corresponding to substantial
uncertainty. As with ﬁgure 1, panel a in ﬁgure 2 has two interpre-
tations. In the ﬁrst interpretation, it just shows the judgment z0
and the optimal policy projection (πˆ0, yˆ0, ıˆ0, rˆ0). In the second in-
terpretation, it shows the time series of inﬂation, the output-gap,
the instrument rate, and the real interest rate, for the particular
realizations of the future deviations that are exactly equal to the
central bank’s judgment in quarter 0. In this interpretation, I also
assume that the private sector has suﬃcient information—cf. the
discussion in section 1.1—to form expectations consistent with the
optimal policy projection.
The optimal policy projection in panel a shows that the central
bank plans to raise the instrument rate to about 2 percentage points
above the steady-state level in the quarters before and including the
time of the inﬂation shock. This makes the output-gap projection fall
to more than −2 percentage points at the time of the expected in-
ﬂation deviation. The inﬂation projection rises before and up to the
expected inﬂation deviation, because private-sector expectations are
forward looking and consistent with the optimal inﬂation projection.
After the expected inﬂation deviation, the instrument rate, the out-
put gap, and inﬂation are projected to return to their steady-state
levels. Again, there is a considerable amount of preemption in the
optimal policy with judgment, with a projected positive real interest
rate and negative output gap before the expected inﬂation deviation.
A substantial intertemporal loss of 25 units results from the optimal
policy projection.
Panel b shows the realizations over time of these variables when
the realization of the inﬂation deviation is equal to 1 percentage
point in quarter 6 and zero in other quarters and the central bank
in each quarter disregards judgment while still responding optimally
to current and lagged inﬂation and output gap. In this case, the
central bank is assumed to respond optimally to both the predeter-
mined variables and the lagged predetermined variables, as if the cen-
tral bank had committed itself to the optimal policy under commit-
ment while ignoring its judgment. Hence, the central bank behaves
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according to instrument rule (48) and responds optimally to the
current deviation but expects zero future deviations. However, the
private sector is assumed to have rational expectations of the future
inﬂation shock. These expectations will increase inﬂation to more
than 4 percentage points at the time of the inﬂation shock. The cen-
tral bank’s optimal response to current and predetermined variables
induces it to raise the instrument rate in line with inﬂation, but it
is nevertheless behind the curve in the sense that the real interest
rate becomes negative and the output gap becomes positive in the
ﬁrst few quarters. The central bank’s response eventually leads to
a high positive real interest rate, a negative output gap, and a fall
in inﬂation. In comparison with panel a, inﬂation rises earlier and
more, and the output gap falls later, than under the optimal mon-
etary policy with judgment. The intertemporal loss is 54 units, a
substantial increase of 29 units above the loss for monetary policy
with judgment.
Panel c shows the situation where the central bank’s judgment
in quarter 0 is such that it expects an output-gap deviation of 1
percentage point in quarter 6 and otherwise zero deviations. The
optimal policy projection, taking this judgment into account, is to
raise the instrument rate before the expected output-gap deviation,
which moderates the expected impact on the output gap. The in-
ﬂation projection remains very ﬂat, and the projections of the real
interest rate and the instrument rate are almost identical. The re-
sulting intertemporal loss is small, 0.56 units.
Panel d shows the realizations over time of the variables in the
situation where the realization of the output-gap deviation is 1 per-
centage point in quarter 6 and zero in other quarters and the central
bank disregards judgment and only responds to current and lagged
predetermined variables, although again optimally so, corresponding
to the instrument rule (48). In comparison with the second interpre-
tation of panel c, when the panel shows the actual realization of the
variables for the same realization of the deviations, the central bank
ends up raising the instrument rate later and more, and there is more
movement in both the output gap and inﬂation. The intertemporal
loss is 1.9 units, 1.3 units above the loss for optimal policy under
judgment.
Again, there are substantial diﬀerences between monetary policy
with and without judgment and corresponding intertemporal losses.
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4.2.1 Taylor Rules
I also examine two variants of Taylor rules for the forward-looking
model, an explicit instrument rule for which the instrument rate
responds to lagged inﬂation and the output gap,
it = 1.5πt−1 + 0.5 yt−1,
and an implicit instrument rule for which the instrument rate re-
sponds to the forward-looking current inﬂation and output,
it = 1.5πt + 0.5 yt.
As noted in section 3, the implementation of an implicit instrument
rule is somewhat complex. I disregard these complications here, and
just assume that it is somehow implemented. Figure 3 shows the
realizations over time of the variables when the central bank imple-
ments the two Taylor rules for the two cases of either an inﬂation
deviation or an output-gap deviation only in quarter 6.
Panels a and b show the result of the explicit and implicit Taylor
rule, respectively, when there is an inﬂation deviation in quarter 6
and the private sector has rational expectations of that deviation.
The resulting intertemporal losses are substantial, 43 and 38 units,
respectively—18 and 13 units, respectively, above the loss for optimal
monetary policy with judgment, 25 units. Interestingly, the intertem-
poral loss with either of the two Taylor rules is less than the policy
without judgment that responds optimally to current and lagged pre-
determined variables, panel b in ﬁgure 2, which has an intertemporal
loss of 54 units. One possible interpretation of this is that history
dependence in the form of responding to the Lagrange multipliers
is not always advantageous, when these multipliers do not take into
account the expected future deviations. The loss for the implicit Tay-
lor rule is lower than for the explicit one. One interpretation is that
the implicit Taylor rule takes private-sector expectations better into
account, and therefore indirectly takes the expected future deviation
better into account.
Panels c and d show the result of the two Taylor rules when
there is an output-gap deviation in quarter 6. Here, the intertemporal
loss is substantially higher than the small loss for monetary policy
without judgment in panel d of ﬁgure 2. In this case, the optimal
50 International Journal of Central Banking May 2005
Figure 3. Monetary Policy with Taylor Rules:
Forward-Looking Model
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response to current and lagged predetermined variables does much
better than the two Taylor rules.
I conclude that the two Taylor rules perform considerably worse
than the optimal policy with judgment, especially when there are
expected future output-gap deviations.
5. Conclusions
The decision process of modern monetary policy that can be called
“forecast targeting”—ﬁnding a projection of the current and future
instrument rate such that the projection paths of the target vari-
ables “look good” relative to the central bank’s objectives—is for-
malized in this paper as a technique that provides projections of the
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instrument rate and the target variables that minimize an intertem-
poral loss function. The paper shows how this technique can easily
incorporate central-bank judgment, a necessary ingredient in mod-
ern monetary policy. In two empirical models of the U.S. economy, a
few examples are shown in which forecast targeting that incorporates
judgment provides signiﬁcantly better monetary policy performance
than a policy that follows an instrument rule and disregards judg-
ment. The paper shows how the policy problem, normally treated
as an inﬁnite-horizon problem, can be reformulated as a convenient
ﬁnite-horizon decision problem, which is either an exact or a very
close approximation to the inﬁnite-horizon problem. This approxi-
mation makes the policy problem much easier to handle numerically.
The paper also shows how the time-consistency problem can be eas-
ily managed and the resulting projections made to be optimal under
commitment in a timeless perspective. In particular, the paper shows
that it is not necessary to be explicit about the underlying complex
reduced-form reaction function of monetary policy. The policymak-
ers only need to ponder the projections of the target variables and
the instrument rate under alternative assumptions, and these pro-
jections can be presented as graphs.
Several of the ideas and techniques presented here are already
applied to various extents by diﬀerent central banks. I hope the
presentation here will be useful for attempts to apply them more
extensively and systematically.
If policymakers hesitate to make the parameters of their loss
function explicit (for instance, the weight on output-gap stabilization
relative to inﬂation stabilization), the techniques presented here can
still be very useful. For instance, the policymakers can ask the staﬀ to
provide optimal policy projections of the target variables for a range
of loss-function parameters. These projections then provide one way
to illustrate the available trade-oﬀs among the target variables, the
set of feasible projections of the target variables from which the
policymakers should choose their optimal policy projection.
The framework used here is one where mean projections are suﬃ-
cient for optimal decisions, what can be called mean forecast target-
ing, which is suﬃcient under the assumptions that result in certainty
equivalence. If these assumptions are not satisﬁed, the principal ideas
in this paper can be extended to a situation when the projections are
probability distributions rather than means, and the intertemporal
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losses can be computed by numerical integration over those distri-
butions. This I have previously called distribution forecast targeting
(Svensson 2001b). The details in such an undertaking remain to be
completed, and the practical diﬀerences between mean and distribu-
tion forecast targeting remain to be clariﬁed. Svensson and Williams
(2005) examine distribution forecast targeting in a situation where
genuine model uncertainty implies that certainty equivalence does
not hold.
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Appendix to Monetary Policy with Judgment: Forecast Targeting
A. Optimal policy under commitment with the deviation being an arbitrary sto-
chastic process
Let the model equations for t ≥ 0 be (2.1). A common special case is when the matrix C = I, but
in general C need not be invertible. This system can be written
C˜
⎡
⎣
Xt+1
Etxt+1
Etit+1
⎤
⎦ = A˜
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦+
∙
zt+1
0
¸
, (A.1)
where Etqt+τ ≡
R
qt+τdΦt(ζt) for any variable qt+τ (τ ≥ 0), the matrices A˜ and C˜ are of dimension
(nX + nx)× (nX + nx + ni) and given by
A˜ ≡
£
A B
¤
≡
∙
A11 A12 B1
A21 A22 B2
¸
, C˜ ≡
∙
I 0 0
0 C 0
¸
.
where A and B are partitioned according to (2.3).
The target variables are defined by (2.5). The intertemporal loss function in period 0 is
E0
∞X
t=0
δtLt,
where the period loss function, (2.7), can be written as
Lt =
1
2
£
X 0t x0t i0t
¤
D0WD
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦ .
Consider minimizing this intertemporal loss function under once-and-for-all commitment in period
t = 0, for given X0 = X¯0. For convergence, when the variance of zt+1 is nonzero, I need 0 < δ < 1.
Variants of this problem are solved in Backus and Driﬃll [2], Currie and Levine [5], and Söderlind
[20], when the deviation is an iid shock. The focus here is on the case when the deviation is an
arbitrary stochastic process.
Construct the Lagrangian,
L0 = E0
∞X
t=0
δt
⎧
⎨
⎩Lt +
£
ξ0t+1 Ξ0t
¤⎛⎝C˜
⎡
⎣
Xt+1
Etxt+1
Etit+1
⎤
⎦− A˜
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦−
∙
zt+1
0
¸⎞
⎠
⎫
⎬
⎭
+ ξ00(X0 − X¯0)/δ
= E0
∞X
t=0
δt
⎧
⎨
⎩Lt +
£
ξ0t+1 Ξ0t
¤⎛⎝C˜
⎡
⎣
Xt+1
xt+1
it+1
⎤
⎦− A˜
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦−
∙
zt+1
0
¸⎞
⎠
⎫
⎬
⎭
+ ξ00(X0 − X¯0)/δ,
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where ξt+1 and Ξt are vectors of nX and nx Lagrange multipliers of the upper and lower block,
respectively, of (A.1). The law of iterated expectations has been used in the second equality,
E0Et = E0 for t ≥ 0. Note that Ξt is dated to emphasize that it depends on information available
in period t.
For t ≥ 1, the first-order conditions with respect to Xt, xt and it can be written£
X 0t x0t i0t
¤
D0WD +
£
ξ0t Ξ0t−1
¤ 1
δ
C˜ −
£
Etξ0t+1 Ξ0t
¤
A˜ = 0. (A.2)
For t = 0, the first-order condition with respect to X0, x0, and i0 can be written£
X 0t x0t i0t
¤
D0WD +
£
ξ0t 0
¤ 1
δ
C˜ −
£
Etξ0t+1 Ξ0t
¤
A˜ = 0, (A.3)
where X0 = X¯0. In comparison with (A.2), a vector of zeros enters in place of Ξ−1, since there is
no constraint corresponding to the lower block of (A.1) for t = −1. By including a fictitious vector
of Lagrange multipliers, Ξ−1, equal to zero,
Ξ−1 = 0, (A.4)
in (A.3), I can write the first-order conditions more compactly as (A.2) for t ≥ 0 and (A.4).
The system of diﬀerence equations (A.2) has nX + nx + ni equations. The first nX equations
can be associated with the Lagrange multipliers ξt. Indeed, − ξt/δ can be interpreted as the total
marginal losses in period t of the predetermined variables Xt (for t = 0, with given X0, the equa-
tions determine ξ0). They are forward-looking variables: Lagrange multipliers for predetermined
variables are always forward-looking, whereas the Lagrange multipliers for the (equations for the)
forward-looking variables are predetermined. The middle nx equations are associated with the La-
grange multipliers Ξt. Indeed, ΞtA22 can be interpreted as the total marginal losses in period t of
the forward-looking variables, xt. Also, ΞtC can be seen as the marginal loss in period t of expec-
tations Etxt+1 of the forward-looking variables. The last ni equations are the first-order equations
for the vector of instruments. In the special case when the lower right ni×ni submatrix of D0WD
is of full rank, the instruments can be solved in terms of the other variables and eliminated from
(A.2), leaving the first nX+nx equations involving the Lagrange multipliers and the predetermined
and forward-looking variables only.
Rewrite the nX + nx + ni first-order conditions as
A˜0
∙
Etξt+1
Ξt
¸
= D0WD
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦+ 1
δ
C˜ 0
∙
ξt
Ξt−1
¸
. (A.5)
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They can be combined with the model equations (A.1) to get a system of 2(nX+nx)+ni diﬀerence
equations for t ≥ 0,
∙
C˜ 0
0 A˜0
¸⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Xt+1
Etxt+1
Etit+1
Etξt+1
Ξt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
∙
A˜ 0
D0WD 1δ C˜
0
¸⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Xt
xt
it
ξt
Ξt−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
zt+1
0
0
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ . (A.6)
Here, Xt and Ξt are predetermined variables, and xt, it, and ξt are non-predetermined variables.
This can be rearranged as the system
C
∙
y1,t+1
Ety2,t+1
¸
=M
∙
y1t
y2t
¸
+
⎡
⎣
∙
zt+1
0
¸
0
⎤
⎦ ,
where
C ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
I 0 0 0 0
0 0 C 0 0
0 A021 0 0 A011
0 A022 0 0 A012
0 B02 0 0 B01
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (A.7)
y1t ≡
∙
Xt
Ξt−1
¸
, y2t ≡
⎡
⎣
xt
it
ξt
⎤
⎦ .
Thus, y1t is a vector of m1 ≡ nX + nx predetermined variables, and y2t is a vector of m2 ≡
nx + ni + nX non-predetermined variables.
Under suitable assumptions (see appendix B), such a system has a unique solution, which can
be written
y2t = F1y1t + Zt (A.8)
y1,t+1 = M1y1t +NEtZt+1 + PEtzt+1 +
∙
zt+1 − Etzt+1
0
¸
, (A.9)
where Zt is an m2-dimensional stochastic process given by
Zt ≡
∞X
τ=0
RτEtzt+1+τ ≡ Rzt, (A.10)
where I can interpret R as a linear operator on zt ≡ Et(z0t+1, z0t+2, ...)0.
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In terms of the original variables, the solution for t ≥ 0, given X0 and Ξ−1 = 0, can be written
⎡
⎣
xt
it
ξt
⎤
⎦ = F1
∙
Xt
Ξt−1
¸
+Rzt
≡ F
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1
⎤
⎦ , (A.11)
∙
Xt+1
Ξt
¸
= M1
∙
Xt
Ξt−1
¸
+NREtz
t+1 + PEtzt+1 +
∙
zt+1 − Etzt+1
0
¸
≡ M
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1
⎤
⎦+
∙
zt+1 − Etzt+1
0
¸
, (A.12)
where F and M are linear operators. The details of the solution are derived in appendix B. The
matrices F1,M1, N , P , and {Rτ}∞τ=0–and thereby the linear operatorsM and F–depend on A, B,
C, D,W , and δ, but are independent of the second and higher moments of the exogenous stochastic
process {zt}∞t=1. This demonstrates the certainty equivalence of the commitment solution.37
If the commitment is once and for all and starts in period 0, Ξ−1 = 0. Commitment in a timeless
perspective can be seen as corresponding to a situation where the lower block of (A.12) is restricted
to apply also for previous periods. Then, Ξt−1 is determined by
Ξt−1 = M121Xt−1 +M122Ξt−2 +N2Et−1Zt + P2Et−1zt
=
∞X
τ=0
M122τ (M121Xt−1−τ +N2Et−1−τZt−τ + P2Et−1−τzt−τ ),
where M1, N , and P are partitioned conformably with Xt and Ξt−1.
Alternatively, the commitment in a timeless perspective can be generated as optimization under
commitment or discretion with a term added to the intertemporal loss function in period 0,
E0
∞X
t=0
δtLt + Ξ−1
1
δ
Cx0,
where Ξ−1 is the Lagrange multiplier for the block of forward-looking equations from the optimiza-
tion in period −1 (see Svensson and Woodford [30] and Svensson [25]).
In the standard case, when zt is a vector of iid zero-mean shocks, I have Etzt+1 ≡ 0, Zt ≡
EtZt+1 ≡ 0, and zt ≡ 0. Thus, the terms involving Zt in (A.11) and (A.12) vanish.38 Consequently,
37 The middle block of (A.11) is the optimal explicit instrument rule for this problem, the instrument written as
a function of predetermined and exogenous variables. Eliminating the Lagrange multipliers from (A.2) results in
the optimal targeting rule for this problem, a consolidated optimal first-order condition for the target variables. See
Svensson [25] on instrument and targeting rules, as well as the lecture notes Svensson [A7].
38 In the case when {zt} is an autoregressive process and can be written zt+1 = Ψzt + εt+1, where Ψ is a matrix
and εt an iid zero-mean process, zt can simply be included among the predetermined variable.
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the eﬀect of zt being an arbitrary exogenous stochastic process shows up only in the addition of the
terms involving Zt and the corresponding matrices N , P , and {Rτ}∞τ=0. Then, I can set M ≡ M1
and F ≡ F1, and
y1,t+1 =My1t + zt+1.
Let Σ denote the variance-covariance matrix of the iid shocks zt+1. Define the matrices D¯ and W¯
according to
Yt = D
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦ = D
⎡
⎣
I 0
F11 F12
F21 F22
⎤
⎦ y1t ≡ D¯y1t,
Lt =
1
2
Y 0tWYt =
1
2
y01tD¯
0WD¯y1t ≡
1
2
y01tW¯y1t,
where W¯ is symmetric and positive semidefinite. Then twice the minimum loss in period t will
satisfy
y01tV y1t + w = Et
∞X
τ=0
δτy01,t+τW¯y1,t+τ
= y01tW¯y1t +Et
∞X
τ=1
δτy01,t+τW¯y1,t+τ
= y01tW¯y1t + δEtEt+1
∞X
τ=0
δτy01,t+1+τW¯y1,t+1+τ
= y01tW¯y1t + δEt(y
0
1,t+1V y1,t+1 + w)
= y01tW¯y1t + δ(y
0
1tM
0VMy1t +Etz01,t+1V z1,t+1 + w)
= y01tW¯y1t + δy
0
1tM
0VMy1t + δtrace(V Σ) + δw.
It follows that
w =
δ
1− δ trace(V Σ),
and that the matrix V satisfies the Lyapunov equation
V = W¯ + δM 0VM. (A.13)
It follows that when trace(V Σ) is nonzero, I must have δ < 1 for the existence of an finite w.
I can use the relations vec(A + B) = vec(A) + vec(B) and vec(ABC) = (C 0 ⊗ A) vec(B) on
(A.13) (where vec(A) denotes the vector of stacked column vectors of the matrix A, and ⊗ denotes
the Kronecker product) which results in
vec (V ) = vec(W¯ ) + δvec
¡
M 0VM
¢
= vec(W¯ ) + δ
¡
M 0 ⊗M 0
¢
vec (V ) .
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Solving for vec (V ) gives
vec (V ) =
£
I − δ
¡
M 0 ⊗M 0
¢¤−1
vec(W¯ ). (A.14)
A.1. No forward-looking variables
If there are no forward-looking variables, so nx = 0, I have
C˜
∙
Xt+1
Etit+1
¸
= A˜
∙
Xt
it
¸
+ zt+1, (A.15)
where the matrices A˜ and C˜ are of dimension nX × (nX + ni) and given by
A˜ ≡
£
A B
¤
, C˜ ≡
£
I 0
¤
.
The period loss function is
Lt =
1
2
Y 0tWYt ≡
1
2
£
X 0t i0t
¤
D0WD
∙
Xt
it
¸
.
The nX + ni first-order conditions can be written
A˜0Etξt+1 = D
0WD
∙
Xt
it
¸
+
1
δ
C˜ 0ξt. (A.16)
Combined with the model equations, I get a system of 2nX + ni diﬀerence equations for t ≥ 0,
∙
C˜ 0
0 A˜0
¸⎡
⎣
Xt+1
Etit+1
Etξt+1
⎤
⎦ =
∙
A˜ 0
D0WD 1δ C˜
0
¸⎡
⎣
Xt
it
ξt
⎤
⎦+
∙
zt+1
0
¸
.
Here, Xt are predetermined variables, and it and ξt are non-predetermined variables.
Under suitable assumptions, this system will have a unique solution for t ≥ 0, given X0, which
can be written
∙
it
ξt
¸
= F1Xt +Rzt,
Xt+1 = M1Xt +N0Rzt + zt+1.
When there are no forward-looking variables, Xt+1 is directly determined by Xt, it, and zt+1
according to (2.1), so M1 and N0 are determined by A, B, and F1 as
M1 ≡ A+BFi,
N0 ≡ [B 0],
where
F1 ≡
∙
Fi
Fξ
¸
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is partitioned conformably with it and ξt. In comparison with the general solution of (A.9), for the
backward-looking case,
N0Rzt ≡ NREtzt+1 + (P − I)Etzt+1.
B. The solution of a system of diﬀerence equations with the deviation
In order to understand the term in the solution (A.10) and (A.11) that corresponds to the deviation,
consider the system
C
∙
y1,t+1
Ety2,t+1
¸
=M
∙
y1t
y2t
¸
+
∙
θt+1
0
¸
(B.1)
for t ≥ 0; where y1t is a vector of m1 predetermined variables (y1t ≡ (X 0t,Ξ0t−1)0 and m1 = nX +nx
in the previous section); y2t is a vector of m2 non-predetermined variables (y2t ≡ (x0t, i0t, ξ0t)0 and
m2 = nx+ni+nX in the previous section); θt is an m1-vector of stochastic processes (θt ≡ (z0t, 00)0
in the previous section); and y10 is given.
By defining the m2-vector of endogenous expectation errors, ηt, as
ηt ≡ y2t − Ety2t,
(B.1) can be written in the form used in Sims [A6],
Γ0yt = Γ1yt−1 +Ψθt +Πηt,
where yt ≡ (y01t, y02t)0. Sims shows that, under suitable assumptions, this system has a unique
solution of the form
yt = Θ1yt−1 +Θ0θt +Θy
∞X
τ=0
ΘτfΘθEtθt+1+τ ,
where Θ0 and Θ1 are real matrices, Θy, Θf , and Θθ are complex matrices, and ΘyΘτfΘθ for any
integer τ ≥ 0 is a real matrix. These matrices can be calculated by his Matlab program Gensys,
available at www.princeton.edu/∼sims. An advantage with Sims’s approach is that one need not
keep track of what variables are predetermined or nonpredetermined. An arguable disadvantage is
that the determination of the expectational errors is somewhat complex.
Here, I prefer to keep close track of what variables are predetermined and nonpredetermined
and therefore choose to derive the solution to (B.1) following a route closer to Klein [A4] than
Sims [A6], but going beyond Klein in, as Sims, explicitly treating the case of θt being an arbitrary
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stochastic process rather than an autoregressive process. The solution will then be of the form
y2t = F1y1t + Zt,
y1,t+1 = M1y1t +NEtZt+1 + PEtθt+1 + (θt+1 − Etθt+1),
Zt ≡
∞X
τ=0
RτEtθt+1+τ ,
where F1, M1, N , P , and Rτ are real matrices to be determined.
Take the expectation conditional on information in period t and write the system as
C
∙
Ety1,t+1
Ety2,t+1
¸
=M
∙
y1t
y2t
¸
+
∙
Etθt+1
0
¸
. (B.2)
Following Klein [A4], Sims [A6], and Söderlind [20], I use the generalized Schur decomposition.
This decomposition results in the square complex matrices Q, S, T , and Z such that
C = Q0SZ 0, (B.3)
M = Q0TZ 0, (B.4)
where Z 0 for a complex matrix denotes the complex conjugate transpose of Z (the transpose of the
complex conjugate of Z).39 The matrices Q and Z are unitary (Q0Q = Z 0Z = I), and S and T
are upper triangular (see Golub and van Loan [A2]). The decomposition is furthermore ordered so
the block consisting of the stable generalized eigenvalues (the jth diagonal element of T divided
by the jth diagonal element of S, λj ≡ tjj/sjj) comes first and the block of unstable generalized
eigenvalues comes last.40
More precisely, I assume the saddle-point property emphasized by Blanchard and Kahn [A1]:
The number of eigenvalues with modulus larger than unity equals the number of nonpredetermined
variables. Thus, I assume that |λj | > 1 for m1+1 ≤ j ≤ m1+m2 and |λj | < 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ m1 (for
an exogenous predetermined variable with a unit root, I can actually allow |λj | = 1 for some 1 ≤ j
≤ m1).
Define ∙
y˜1t
y˜2t
¸
≡ Z 0
∙
y1t
y2t
¸
. (B.5)
I can interpret y˜1t as a complex vector of m1 transformed predetermined variables and y˜2t as a
complex vector of m2 transformed non-predetermined variables. Premultiply the system (B.2) by
39 Let the elements of the complex matrix Z be denoted zjk ≡ Re(zjk)+ i Im(zjk). Then the complex conjugate of
the matrix Z is the matrix of elements z¯jk ≡ Re(zjk)− i Im(zjk).
40 The sorting of the eigenvalues is often done by two programs written by Sims and available at
www.princeton.edu/∼sims, Qzdiv and Qzswitch.
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Q and use (B.3)-(B.5) to write it as
∙
S11 S12
0 S22
¸ ∙
Ety˜1,t+1
Ety˜2,t+1
¸
=
∙
T11 T12
0 T22
¸ ∙
y˜1t
y˜2t
¸
+
∙
Q11
Q21
¸
Etθt+1, (B.6)
where S, T , and Q have been partitioned conformably with y˜1t and y˜2t.
Consider the lower block of (B.6),
S22 Ety˜2,t+1 = T22 y˜2t +Q21Etθt+1. (B.7)
Since the diagonal terms of S22 and T22 (sjj and tjj for m1+1 ≤ j ≤ m1+m2) satisfy |tjj/sjj | > 1,
the diagonal terms of T22 are nonzero, the determinant of T22 is nonzero, and T22 is invertible. Note
that S22 may not be invertible. I can then solve for y˜2t as
y˜2t = JEty˜2,t+1 +KEtθt+1 (B.8)
=
∞X
τ=0
JτKEtθt+1+τ (B.9)
for t ≥ 0, where the complex matrices J and K (m2 ×m2 and m2 ×m1, respectively) are given by
J ≡ T−122 S22, (B.10)
K ≡ −T−122 Q21. (B.11)
Here, I have exploited that the modulus of the diagonal terms of T−122 S22 is less than one. I also
assume that Ety˜2,t+τ and Etθt+τ are suﬃciently bounded. Then JτEty˜2,t+τ → 0 when τ →∞, and
the infinite sum on the right side converges. Note that J may not be invertible, since S22 may not
be invertible.
I have, by (B.5),
y1t = Z11y˜1t + Z12y˜2t, (B.12)
y2t = Z21y˜1t + Z22y˜2t, (B.13)
where
Z ≡
∙
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
¸
(B.14)
is partitioned conformably with y1t and y2t. Under the assumption of the saddle-point property,
Z11 is square. I furthermore assume that Z11 is invertible. Then I can solve for y˜1t in (B.12),
y˜1t = Z
−1
11 y1t − Z−111 Z12y˜2t, (B.15)
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and use this in (B.13) to get
y2t = F1y1t +Hy˜2t, (B.16)
where the real m2 ×m1 matrix F1 and the complex m2 ×m2 matrix H are given by
F1 ≡ Z21Z−111 , (B.17)
H ≡ Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12. (B.18)
I will show below that H is invertible.
By (B.9) and (B.16), I can then write the solution of y2t as
y2t = F1y1t + Zt, (B.19)
where Zt is a real exogenous m2-vector stochastic process (not to be confused with the unitary
matrix Z in the Schur decomposition) given by
Zt ≡ Hy˜2t ≡
∞X
τ=0
RτEtθt+1+τ , (B.20)
Rτ ≡ HJτK (τ ≥ 0), (B.21)
where the matrices Rτ are real.
I note that the complex conjugate transpose of Z, Z 0, satisfies
Z 0 ≡
∙
Z 011 Z 021
Z 012 Z 022
¸
, (B.22)
where the submatrices are given by (B.14). Since Z 0Z = ZZ 0 = I, I have
∙
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
¸ ∙
Z 011 Z 021
Z 012 Z 022
¸
=
∙
Z11Z 011 + Z12Z 012 Z11Z 021 + Z12Z 022
Z21Z 011 + Z22Z 012 Z21Z 021 + Z22Z 022
¸
=
∙
I 0
0 I
¸
, (B.23)
By (B.22), I can write
y˜2t = Z 012y1t + Z
0
22y2t.
Using this in (B.16) gives
y2t = F1y1t +H(Z 012y1t + Z
0
22y2t)
= (F1 +HZ
0
12)y1t +HZ
0
22y2t.
It follows that
F1 +HZ
0
12 = 0, (B.24)
HZ 022 = I. (B.25)
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I can also show (B.24) by using (B.23),
Z21Z
−1
11 + (Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12)Z 012 = Z21Z−111 + Z22Z 012 − Z21Z−111 Z12Z 012
= Z21Z
−1
11 + Z22Z
0
12 − Z21Z−111 (I − Z11Z 011)
= Z21Z
−1
11 + Z22Z
0
12 − Z21Z−111 + Z21Z 011
= 0.
Similarly, I can show (B.25) by
(Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12)Z 022 = Z22Z 022 − Z21Z−111 Z12Z 022
= Z22Z 022 − Z21Z−111 (−Z11Z 021)
= Z22Z
0
22 + Z21Z
0
21
= I.
It follows from (B.25) that H is invertible and that its inverse is given by
H−1 = Z 022. (B.26)
It remains to find a solution for y1,t+1. The upper block of (B.6) is
S11Ety˜1,t+1 + S12Ety˜2,t+1 = T11y˜1t + T12y˜2t +Q11Etθt+1.
Since the diagonal terms of S11 and T11 satisfy |tjj/sjj | < 1, all diagonal terms of S11 must be
nonzero, so the determinant of S11 is nonzero, and S11 is invertible. I can then solve for Ety˜1,t+1 as
Ety˜1,t+1 = S
−1
11 (T11y˜1t + T12y˜2t)− S−111 S12Ety˜2,t+1 + S−111 Q11Etθt+1.
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By (B.12),
Ety1,t+1 = Z11Ety˜1,t+1 + Z12Ety˜2,t+1
= Z11[S
−1
11 (T11y˜1t + T12y˜2t)− S−111 S12Ety˜2,t+1 + S−111 Q11Etθt+1] + Z12Ety˜2,t+1
= Z11S
−1
11 T11y˜1t + Z11S
−1
11 T12y˜2t + (Z12 − Z11S−111 S12)Ety˜2,t+1 + Z11S−111 Q11Etθt+1
= Z11S
−1
11 T11(Z
−1
11 y1t − Z−111 Z12y˜2t) + Z11S−111 T12y˜2t + (Z12 − Z11S−111 S12)Ety˜2,t+1
+Z11S
−1
11 Q11Etθt+1
= Z11S
−1
11 T11Z
−1
11 y1t + Z11S
−1
11 (T12 − T11Z−111 Z12)y˜2t
+(Z12 − Z11S−111 S12)Ety˜2,t+1 + Z11S−111 Q11Etθt+1
= Z11S
−1
11 T11Z
−1
11 y1t + Z11S
−1
11 (T12 − T11Z−111 Z12)(JEty˜2,t+1 +KEtθt+1)
+ (Z12 − Z11S−111 S12)Ety˜2,t+1 + Z11S−111 Q11Etθt+1
= Z11S
−1
11 T11Z
−1
11 y1t
+ [Z11S
−1
11 (T12 − T11Z−111 Z12)J + (Z12 − Z11S−111 S12)]Ety˜2,t+1
+Z11S
−1
11 [Q11 + (T12 − T11Z−111 Z12)K]Etθt+1, (B.27)
where I have used (B.15) and (B.8).
It follows that I can use (B.27), (B.20), and (B.26) and write the solution as
y1,t+1 =My1t +NEtZt+1 + PEtθt+1 + (θt+1 − Etθt+1), (B.28)
where the real matrices M , N , and P are given by
M ≡ Z11S−111 T11Z−111 , (B.29)
N ≡ [Z11S−111 (T12 − T11Z−111 Z12)J + (Z12 − Z11S−111 S12)]Z 022, (B.30)
P ≡ Z11S−111 [Q11 + (T12 − T11Z−111 Z12)K]. (B.31)
Thus, the solution to the system (B.1) is given by (B.19) and (B.28) for t ≥ 0. This results in
the solution (A.11)-(A.12) above, where the matrix P in (A.12) is the submatrix of the first nX
rows of the matrix P in (B.31) (since θt+1 ≡ (z0t+1, 00)0).
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C. The model when judgment is a finite-order moving average
When the deviation is a finite-order moving-average process and the dynamics of the deviation and
judgment is described by (2.16), the model can be written as
⎡
⎣
Xt+1
zt+1
Cxt+1|t
⎤
⎦ = A¯
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
xt
⎤
⎦+ B¯it +
⎡
⎣
εt+1
εt+1
0
⎤
⎦ , (C.1)
where the matrices A¯ and B¯ are given by
A¯ ≡
⎡
⎣
A11 Az12 A12
0 Az22 0
A21 0 A22
⎤
⎦ , B¯ ≡
⎡
⎣
B1
0
B2
⎤
⎦ ,
the matrix Az is partitioned conformably with zt and zt as
Az ≡
∙
0 Az12
0 Az22
¸
,
and ε˜t ≡ (ε0t, εt 0)0 is zero-mean and iid. Thus, this results in the standard forward-looking linear-
quadratic model, with the predetermined variables being Xt and zt. The optimal policy projection
can then be described as (2.17) and (2.18), where F and M are finite-dimensional matrices. The
intertemporal loss for the optimal policy projection can then be written as
1
2
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦
0
V
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦ ,
where the matrix V is the solution to the Lyapunov equation,
V = W¯ + δM 0VM,
the symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix W¯ is defined by
W¯ =
⎡
⎣
I 0 0
Fx
Fi
⎤
⎦
0
D0WD
⎡
⎣
I 0 0
Fx
Fi
⎤
⎦ ,
and the matrix F is partitioned conformably with xt and it as
F ≡
∙
Fx
Fi
¸
.
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D. TheMarcet-Marimonmethod to solve the linear-quadratic optimization prob-
lem with forward-looking variables
Let X¯t ≡ (Xt, zt) and write the model (C.1) as
X¯t+1 = A¯11X¯t + A¯12xt + B¯1it + ε˜t+1, (D.1)
CEtxt+1 = A¯21X¯t + A¯22xt + B¯2it. (D.2)
Write the period loss function as
Lt =
1
2
⎡
⎣
X¯t
xt
it
⎤
⎦
0
W 0
⎡
⎣
X¯t
xt
it
⎤
⎦ , (D.3)
where the symmetric positive semidefinite matrix W 0 is defined by
⎡
⎣
X¯t
xt
it
⎤
⎦
0
W 0
⎡
⎣
X¯t
xt
it
⎤
⎦ ≡
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦
0
D0WD
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦ .
Consider the problem in period 0,
min
{it}t≥0
E0
∞X
t=0
δtLt, (D.4)
subject to (D.1), (D.2) and X0 given. The minimization is taken to be under commitment.
Marcet and Marimon [14] show that this problem can be reformulated as a recursive saddlepoint
problem,
max
{γt}t≥0
min
{xt,it}t≥0
E0
∞X
t=0
δtL˜t, (D.5)
where the modified period loss function satisfies
L˜t ≡ L˜(X¯t,Ξt−1;xt, it, γt)
≡ Lt + L1t
≡ Lt + γ0t(− A¯21X¯t − A¯22xt − B¯2it) +
1
δ
Ξ0t−1Cxt,
and the optimization is subject to (D.1), to
Ξt = γt, (D.6)
and to X0 and Ξ−1 = 0 given. The value function for the saddlepoint problem, starting in any
period t, satisfies
V˜ (X¯t,Ξt−1) ≡ max
γt
min
(xt,it)
{L˜(X¯t,Ξt−1;xt, it, γt) + δEtV˜ (X¯t+1,Ξt)},
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subject to (D.1) and (D.6).
Define
X˜t ≡
∙
X¯t
Ξt−1
¸
, ı˜t ≡
⎡
⎣
xt
it
γt
⎤
⎦ ,
and define W¯ , A˜, B˜, and C˜ such that
L˜t ≡
1
2
∙
X˜t
ı˜t
¸0
W¯
∙
X˜t
ı˜t
¸
, (D.7)
X˜t+1 = A˜X˜t + B˜ı˜t + C˜ε˜t+1. (D.8)
The problem (D.5) subject to (D.8) and given X˜t is isomorphic to a standard backward-looking
linear-quadratic problem, except being a saddlepoint problem. However, the saddlepoint aspect
does not aﬀect the first-order conditions. It is easy to show that the first-order conditions of the
saddlepoint problem are identical to those of the original problem, (D.4) subject to (D.1) and (D.2).
The value function for the saddlepoint problem is quadratic,
V˜ (X˜t) ≡
1
2
(X˜ 0tV˜ X˜t + w˜),
where V˜ solves the Riccati equation,
V˜ = Q+ δA˜0V˜ A˜− (δB˜0V˜ A˜+N 0)0(δB˜0V˜ B˜ +R)−1(δB˜0V˜ A˜+N 0),
where
W¯ ≡
∙
Q N
N 0 R
¸
,
is partitioned conformably with X˜t and ı˜t.
The optimal reaction function for the saddlepoint problem is linear,
ı˜t = FX˜t ≡
⎡
⎣
Fx
Fi
Fγ
⎤
⎦ X˜t,
where F is partitioned conformably with xt, it, and γt and satisfies
F ≡ − (δB˜0V˜ B˜ +R)−1(δB˜0V˜ A˜+N 0).
This reaction function function is the optimal reaction function function for the original problem.
Optimization in a timeless perspective in period t corresponds to taking Ξt−1 from the previous
period’s decision problem as given, also in period 0.
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The equilibrium dynamics will be given by
X˜t+1 = MX˜t + C˜εt+1,
xt = FxX˜t,
it = FiX˜t,
Lt =
1
2
X˜ 0tW˜ X˜t,
where
M ≡ A˜+ B˜F˜ ,
W˜ ≡
⎡
⎣
I 0
Fx
Fi
⎤
⎦
0
W 0
⎡
⎣
I 0
Fx
Fi
⎤
⎦ .
The value function for the saddlepoint problem can be decomposed according to
1
2
(X˜ 0tV˜ X˜t + w˜) ≡
1
2
(X˜ 0tV X˜t + w) +
1
2
(X˜ 0tV
1X˜t + w1),
where
1
2
(X˜ 0tV X˜t +w) ≡ Et
∞X
τ=0
δτ−t
1
2
X˜ 0t+τW˜ X˜t+τ ,
is the value function for the original problem starting in period t with X˜t ≡ (X 0t,Ξ0t−1)0 given. The
matrix V will satisfy the Lyapunov equation,
V = W˜ + δM 0VM,
and, when δ < 1, the constant w will satisfy
w =
δ
1− δ tr(C˜
0V C˜Σε˜ε˜),
where Σε˜ε˜ is the covariance matrix for ε˜t.
E. An alternative finite-horizon numerical procedure for forward-looking models
In the finite-horizon model in section 3.1, there is an obvious alternative numerical procedure that
will provide a projection arbitrarily close to the optimal policy projection without requiring such a
long horizon that Xt+T,t and Ξt+T−1,t are close to their steady-state levels. It requires iterations,
though.
60
Assume that iteration j−1 has resulted in Ξ(j−1)t+T−1,t. Start iteration j by using (2.17) and (2.18)
to replace (3.3) by
xt+T+1,t = FxM1
"
Xt+T,t
Ξ(j−1)t+T−1,t
#
,
where the matrices F1 and M1 are defined by
F
⎡
⎣
Xt
0
Ξt−1
⎤
⎦ ≡ F1
∙
Xt
Ξt−1
¸
, M
⎡
⎣
Xt
0
Ξt−1
⎤
⎦ ≡M1
∙
Xt
Ξt−1
¸
,
and F1 is partitioned conformably with xt and it as
F1 ≡
∙
Fx
Fi
¸
.
Consequently, replace (3.4) by
−A21Xt+T,t −A22xt+T,t −B2it+T,t + CFxM1
"
Xt+T,t
Ξ(j−1)t+T−1,t
#
= 0. (E.1)
Use (3.1), (3.2), and (E.1) to construct G and gt (the left submatrix of the matrix CFxM1 will
enter the last block of G and the product of the right submatrix and Ξ(j−1)t+T−1,t will enter the last
block of gt). Furthermore, add the term (3.7) with Ξt+T−1,t = Ξ
(j−1)
t+T−1,t to the loss function (that is,
modify the diagonal block of Ω that corresponds to Xt+T,t and add a linear term that corresponds
to the cross products of Xt+T,t and Ξ
(j−1)
t+T−1,t). Find the optimal policy projection sˆ
t(j) and Lagrange
multiplier Λt(j) via the analogue of (3.12). This ends iteration j and results in Ξ(j)t+T−1,t. Continue
until Ξ(j)t+T−1,t has converged.
Obviously this alternative procedure does not require that Xt+T,t and Ξt+T−1,t are close to
their steady-state levels. Which procedure is fastest will depend on the number of variables in the
problem and the rate of convergence towards the steady state of the optimal policy projection.
F. The feasible set of projections of the states of the economy, the feasible set of
projections of the target variables, and the optimal targeting rule
In the finite-horizon projection model in section 3.1, the feasible set of projections in period t of
the states of the economy, St, is the set of projections st that satisfy (3.5), repeated here as
Gst = gt. (F.1)
That is, St is the set of solutions to (F.1) for given G and gt. Define n ≡ (T + 1)(nX + nx + ni),
m ≡ (T + 1)(nX + nx) < n, and p ≡ (T + 1)ni ≡ n−m. Note that G is m× n, st is n× 1, and gt
is m× 1. Assume that G is of rank m.
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Since G is of rank m, the set of solutions to (F.1) is a linear manifold of Rn of dimension
p ≡ n−m.41 It can be written as the set of projections st that satisfy
st = G+gt + (I −G+G)ξ (F.2)
for any ξ ∈ Rn (see Harville [A2, chapters 11 and 20]). Here, the n×m matrix G+ is the Moore-
Penrose inverse of G. When G is m× n and of rank m, the Moore-Penrose inverse is given by
G+ = G0(GG0)−1
(note that GG0 is m × m, of rank m, and hence invertible). Then, G+G = G0(GG0)−1G is a
projection matrix that projects vectors in Rn on the m-dimensional column space of the n × m
matrix G0, the transpose of G.42 Denote the column space of G0 by C(G0). For any ξ in Rn,
the vector G+Gξ lies in C(G0). Then I − G+G is a projection matrix that projects vectors in Rn
oﬀ the column space of G0, that is, on the p-dimensional subspace of Rn orthogonal to C(G0),
the orthogonal complement of C(G0) (relative to Rn), denoted C⊥(G0). Hence, the solution set St
consist of C⊥(G0) shifted away from the origin by the vector G+gt,
St = {G+gt}+ C⊥(G0).
Furthermore, the vector G+gt is the st of minimum norm that satisfies (F.1). Then, G+gt is
orthogonal to the solution set St and lies in the column space of G, C(G0).43
Figure F.1 provides an illustration of the above, when n = 2 andm = p = 1. The linear manifold
St, the set of feasible projections of the states of the economy, st, is shown as the negatively sloped
line through the point st = G+gt. The column space C(G0) is the positively sloped line through
the origin. The linear manifold St is orthogonal to the column space. The orthogonal complement
of the column space, C⊥(G0), is the negatively sloped line through the origin. The linear manifold
is the orthogonal complement shifted away from the origin to the point G+gt. Furthermore, the
point G+gt is the point in the linear manifold with the shortest distance to the origin.
Let G⊥ denote a p× n matrix with p linearly independent rows, each of which is orthogonal to
the m rows of G. Then C⊥(G0) = C(G⊥0), where the latter expression denotes the column space of
41 Let V be a linear space. A subset S of V is a linear manifold of V (also called a linear variety of V ), if there is a
v in V such that the set S− {v} ≡ {s− v|s ∈ S} is a subspace of V . The dimension of S is the dimension of S− {v}.
Hence, a linear manifold is a subspace that has possibly been shifted away from the origin (in the above case by the
vector v).
42 In this section, the word “projection” is used not only to refer to mean forecasts but also, depending on the
context, to refer to mathematical projections in linear space.
43 A vector is orthogonal to a linear manifold if it is orthogonal to the corresponding subspace.
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Figure F.1: The set of feasible projections of the state of the economy, St
RnC(G' )
C (G' )
St
G+gt
0
st^
⊥
Ωst+ωt–1^
G⊥0, and St can be written as the set of projections st that satisfy
st = G+gt +G⊥0ξ
for any ξ ∈ Rn.
The projection of the target variables, Y t, is a linear function of the projection of the states of
the economy according to (3.6), repeated here as
Y t = D˜st. (F.3)
Let q ≡ (T +1)nY ≤ n, note that Y t is q× 1 and D˜ is q×n, and take D˜ to be of rank q. It follows
that the set of feasible projections of the target variables, Yt, consists of the set of projections Y t
that satisfy
Y t = D˜G+gt + D˜G⊥0ξ
for any ξ in Rn. This is a linear manifold of Rq of dimension at most min(p, q). If I take as the
normal case that the number of target variables is at least as large as the number of instruments,
nY ≥ ni (typically, there are at least two target variables, inflation and the output gap, but only
one instrument, the instrument rate), I have q ≥ p, and the set of feasible projections of the target
variables, Yt, is a linear manifold of Rq of dimension at most p ≤ q. The matrix D˜ simply maps
the p-dimensional linear manifold St of Rn into the at most p-dimensional linear manifold Yt of Rq.
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Figure F.2: The set of feasible projections of the target variables, Yt
Rq
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It follows that Yt is the at most p-dimensional column space C(D˜G⊥0) in Rq shifted away from
the origin by the vector D˜G+gt,
Yt = {D˜G+gt}+ C(D˜G⊥0).
Figure F.2 provides an illustration of the above, when q = 2 and p = 1. The linear manifold
Yt, the set of feasible projections of the target variables, Y t, is shown as the negatively sloped line
through the point Y t = D˜G+gt. The column space of the matrix D˜G⊥0, C(D˜G⊥0), is shown as the
negative sloped line through the origin. The linear manifold Yt is this column space shifted away
from the origin to the point D˜G+gt.
F.1. An optimal targeting rule for the forward-looking model
Consider the first-order condition for optimal policy under commitment in a timeless perspective
in the forward-looking model, (3.10), rewritten here as
Ωst + ωt−1 +G
0Λt = 0 (F.4)
The optimal targeting rule is the first-order condition in terms of Y t when the Lagrange multiplier
has been eliminated.
Let me interpret the first-order condition in terms of st, eliminate the Lagrange multiplier, and
interpret the resulting targeting rule. Note that Ω is n× n, st and ωt−1 are n× 1, G0 is n×m and
of rank m, and Λt is m× 1.
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Write the first-order condition as
Ωst + ωt−1 = G
0(−Λt). (F.5)
The term Ωst+ωt−1 on the left side is the gradient of the loss function with respect to st, a vector
in Rn. The condition (F.5) can be interpreted as stating that the gradient of the loss function is an
element of the m-dimensional column space of the n×m matrix G0, C(G0), with −Λt providing the
coeﬃcients of the corresponding linear combination of the column vectors of G0. This is equivalent
to the tangency of the loss function’s iso-loss surface in Rn with the feasible set of projections,
St. The gradient of the loss function is orthogonal to the iso-loss surface. Tangency of the iso-loss
surface with St is then equivalent to the gradient being orthogonal to St. The subspace orthogonal
to St is C(G0), as noted above.
This is illustrated in figure F.1 when n = 2 and m = p = 1. The curve shows part of the iso-loss
surface of the loss function that is tangential to the linear manifold St. The tangency occurs at
the optimal policy projection, sˆt. The gradient of the loss function at that point, Ωsˆt + ωt−1, is
shown as the vector pointing northeast from that point. Tangency between the iso-loss surface and
the linear manifold is equivalent to the gradient being orthogonal to the linear manifold, or the
gradient being an element in the column space, C(G0).
In order to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers, premultiply (F.5) by G,44
G(Ωst + ωt−1) = GG
0(−Λt). (F.6)
Exploit that GG0 is m×m, of rank m, and hence invertible, and solve for −Λt,
−Λt = (GG0)−1G(Ωst + ωt−1). (F.7)
(The matrix (GG0)−1G is actually the Moore-Penrose inverse of G0, G0+, where G0 is n ×m with
rank m.) Substitution of Λt in (F.4) gives
M(Ωst + ωt−1) = 0, (F.8)
where M is the n× n matrix (not to be confused with the matrix denoted M in other sections of
this paper)
M ≡ I −G0(GG0)−1G = I −G+G.
44 One might ask why multipliying with the matrix G with rank m < n rather than a matrix with full rank n does
not loose any information of (F.5). More formally, let G⊥ be a p× n matrix whose p rows are linearly independent
and orthogonal to the m rows of G. That is, the column space of G⊥0 is the space in Rn orthogonal to the column
space of G0. Then the n×n matrix
k
G
G⊥
l
is of full rank. Multiplying (F.5) by this matrix leads to the m equations
of (F.6) and p additional trivial equations of zero equals zero, since we know that the left and right sides of (F.5) lie
in the column space of G0.
65
As noted above, M is the projection matrix that projects vectors in Rn on the p-dimensional
orthogonal complement of the column space of G0, C⊥(G0). Hence, (F.8) states that the projection
on C⊥(G0) of the gradient of the loss function is zero. Of course, this follows directly from the
observation above that the gradient lies in C(G0).
In any case, the optimal targeting rule in terms of st is equivalent to the statement that the
gradient is orthogonal to the feasible set of projections of the states of the economy, St, which can
be expressed algebraically as (F.8).
However, (F.8) involves n equations, but only p independent equations. It is hence desirable to
condense (F.8) to only p equations. The projection matrix M is a symmetric idempotent matrix of
rank p. Then its spectrum consists of p eigenvalues equal to one and m eigenvalues equal to zero,
and it can be decomposed as
M = Q
∙
Ip 0
0 0
¸
Q0 ≡
£
Qp Qm
¤ ∙ Ip 0
0 0
¸ ∙
Q0p
Q0m
¸
≡ QpQ0p.
Here Q is the orthonormal n× n matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of M , Ip is the p× p
identity matrix, and Qp is the n× p matrix whose columns are the p eigenvectors corresponding to
the p nonzero eigenvalues. Then, pre-multiplying (F.8) by Q0 gives the p nontrivial equations,
Q0p(Ωs
t + ωt−1) = 0, (F.9)
and m trivial equations of zero equals zero.
Furthermore, (F.9) is expressed in terms of the projection of the states of the economy, st. In
order to express it in terms of the projection of the target variables, Y t, note that, by the definition
of Ω for the forward-looking model in section 3.1,
Ωst ≡ D˜0W˜ D˜st ≡ D˜0W˜Y t,
where W˜ is a symmetric positive semidefinite block-diagonal (T +1)nY matrix with the (τ +1)-th
diagonal block being δτW for 0 ≤ τ ≤ T . Hence, I can write (F.9) as involving only the target
variables and, through the vector ωt−1, the Lagrange multiplier Ξt−1,t−1 from the optimization in
period t− 1,
Q0p[D˜
0W˜Y t + ωt−1] = 0. (F.10)
This is one concise form of the targeting rule. The history-dependence of the optimal policy
under commitment in a timeless perspective enters via Ξt−1,t−1.
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By combining (F.9) with (3.5), I get
∙
G
Q0pΩ
¸
st =
∙
gt
−Q0pωt−1
¸
,
and
sˆt =
∙
G
Q0pΩ
¸−1 ∙
gt
−Q0pωt−1
¸
≡ H
⎡
⎣
Xt
Ξt−1,t−1
zt
⎤
⎦ , (F.11)
Yˆ t = D˜sˆt = D˜H
⎡
⎣
Xt
Ξt−1,t−1
zt
⎤
⎦ .
From (F.7) and (F.11), I can extract
Ξt,t = HΞ
⎡
⎣
Xt
Ξt−1,t−1
zt
⎤
⎦ ,
to be used in the intertemporal loss function for the decision problem in period t+ 1.
If the forward-looking variables, xt, are target variables–elements of Yt–the intertemporal loss
function with the added term can be written
1
2
Y t 0W˜Y t +w0t−1Y
t,
where wt−1 is a q-vector whose only nonzero elements contain the vector (Ξt−1,t−1 1δC)
0 such that
w0t−1Y t ≡ Ξt−1,t−1 1δCxt,t. Then, the optimal targeting rule can be expressed as the gradient,
W˜Y t + wt−1, being orthogonal to the linear manifold Yt. Suppose Yt is of dimension p, and let
F ≡ D˜G⊥0 (not to be confused with the matrix denoted F in other sections of the paper). The
projection matrix that projects vectors in Rq on the p-dimensional subspace Yt− {D˜G+gt} is then
F (F 0F )−1F 0, so the condition that the gradient is orthogonal to the linear manifold Yt can be
written as the p equations.
F (F 0F )−1F 0W˜ (ΩY t + wt−1) = 0.
This is the optimal targeting rule for this case.
This case is illustrated in figure F.2. The curve in the figure shows a part of the iso-loss surface
of the loss function that is tangential to the linear manifold Yt. The tangency point is the optimal
policy projection of the target variables, Yˆ t. The gradient of the loss function at that point,
W˜ Yˆ t + wt−1, is shown as the vector at that point that points northeast. It is orthogonal to the
linear manifold.
Svensson [25] interprets optimal targeting rules in terms of the equality between the marginal
rates of transformation and marginal rates of substitution between the target variables. A vector
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of marginal rates of transformation between the target variables is a vector in the column space
C(D˜G⊥0), the subspace associated with Yt. A vector of marginal rates of substitution between the
target variables is a vector in the tangent space of the intertemporal loss function, the subspace
orthogonal to the gradient of the loss function. Equality between the marginal rates of transfor-
mation and substitution is equivalent to the gradient being orthogonal to Yt, that is, the iso-loss
surface being tangential to Yt.
G. An optimal restricted instrument rule
Add to the model (2.1) an explicit instrument rules of the form
it = fXXt, (G.1)
where the ni×nX matrix fX is restricted to be an element fX ∈ F of a given class F of instrument
rules. Assume that the deviation zt is an iid zero-mean process with variance-covariance matrix Σ.
Let the loss function in period t be
lim
δ→1
Et
∞X
τ=0
(1− δ)δτLt+τ = E[Lt],
where Lt is given by (2.7). By appendix A, for a given instrument rule fX , the conditional loss in
period t is, for a given δ (0 < δ < 1), given by
Et
∞X
τ=0
(1− δ)δτLt+τ =
1
2
{(1− δ)X 0tV (fX , δ)Xt + δtrace[V (fX , δ)Σ]},
where V (fX , δ) is a symmetric positive semidefinite nX × nX matrix that depends on A, B, C, D,
W , fX , and δ. It follows that
E[Lt] =
1
2
trace[V (fX , 1)Σ].
The optimal restricted instrument rule, fˆX , is then given by
fˆX = arg min
fX∈F
1
2
trace[V (fX , 1)Σ].
It depends on the class F and the variance-covariance matrix Σ, in addition to A, B, C, D, and
W .
Note that there is little point in considering implicit instrument rules here,
it = fXXt + fxxt. (G.2)
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For any such implicit instrument rule f ≡ [fX fx] for which a unique equilibrium exists,
xt = g(f)Xt,
where the matrix g(f) depends on f . Then,
it = [fX + fxg(f)]Xt ≡ f˜X(f)Xt.
That is, for each implicit instrument rule f for which there is a unique equilibrium, there is a
unique explicit instrument rule f˜X(f) consistent with that equilibrium. Furthermore, for any
explicit instrument rule fX in (G.1) for which there is a unique equilibrium, there is a continuum
of implicit instrument rules consistent with that equilibrium. For any given instrument rule fX for
which there exists a unique equilibrium,xt = g(fX)Xt, where the matrix g(fX) depends on fX . For
any arbitrary ni × nx matrix fx, I can then write
it = fXXt + fx[xt − g(fX)Xt] = [fX − fxg(fX)]Xt + fxxt ≡ f˜X(fX , fx)Xt + fxxt.
The only reason for considering implicit instrument rules rather than an explicit instrument rule in
this context (when the deviation is an iid zero-mean shock) is when an explicit instrument rule has a
determinacy problem–multiple equilibria–in which case one may be able to find a corresponding
implicit instrument rule for which there is a unique equilibrium. Svensson and Woodford [30]
examine such issues further.
H. An empirical backward-looking model
The two equations of the model of Rudebusch and Svensson [18] are
πt+1 = απ1πt + απ2πt−1 + απ3πt−2 + απ4πt−3 + αyyt + zπ,t+1 (H.1)
yt+1 = βy1yt + βy2yt−1 − βr
µ
1
4
Σ3j=0it−j −
1
4
Σ3j=0πt−j
¶
+ zy,t+1, (H.2)
where πt is quarterly inflation in the GDP chain-weighted price index (pt) in percentage points at
an annual rate, i.e., 400(ln p− ln pt−1); it is the quarterly average federal funds rate in percentage
points at an annual rate; yt is the relative gap between actual real GDP (qt) and potential GDP (q∗t )
in percentage points, i.e., 100(qt− q∗t )/q∗t . These five variables were de-meaned prior to estimation,
so no constants appear in the equations.
The estimated parameters, using the sample period 1961:1 to 1996:2, are shown in table H.1.
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Table H.1
απ1 απ2 απ3 απ4 αy βy1 βy2 βr
0.70
(0.08)
− 0.10
(0.10)
0.28
(0.10)
0.12
(0.08)
0.14
(0.03)
1.16
(0.08)
− 0.25
(0.08)
0.10
(0.03)
The hypothesis that the sum of the lag coeﬃcients of inflation equals one has a p-value of .16, so
this restriction was imposed in the estimation.45
The state-space form can be written
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
πt+1
πt
πt−1
πt−2
yt+1
yt
it
it−1
it−2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
P4
j=1 απjej + αye5
e1
e2
e3
βre1:4 + βy1e5 + βy2e6 − βre7:9
e5
e0
e7
e8
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
πt
πt−1
πt−2
πt−3
yt
yt−1
it−1
it−2
it−3
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
0
0
0
− βr4
0
1
0
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
it +
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
zπ,t+1
0
0
0
zy,t+1
0
0
0
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
where ej (j = 0, 1, ..., 9) denotes a 1×9 row vector, for j = 0 with all elements equal to zero, for
j = 1, ..., 9 with element j equal to unity and all other elements equal to zero; and where ej:k
(j < k) denotes a 1×9 row vector with elements j, j + 1, ..., k equal to 14 and all other elements
equal to zero. The predetermined variables are πt, πt−1, πt−2, πt−3, yt, yt−1, it−1, it−2, it−2, and
it−3. There are no forward-looking variables.
For a loss function (5.3) with δ = 1, λ = 1, and ν = 0.2, and the case where zt is an iid zero-
mean shock; the optimal reaction function (2.21) is (the coeﬃcients are rounded to two decimal
points),
it = 1.22πt+0.43πt−1+0.53πt−2+0.18πt−3+1.93 yt− 0.49 yt−1+0.36 it−1− 0.09 it−2− 0.05 it−3.
I. An empirical forward-looking model
An empirical New Keynesian model estimated by Lindé [13] is
πt = ωfπt+1|t + (1− ωf )πt−1 + γyt + zπt,
yt = βfyt+1|t + (1− βf )(βy1yt−1 + βy2yt−2 + βy3yt−3 + βy4yt−4)− βr(it − πt+1|t) + zyt,
where the restriction
P4
j=1 βyj = 1 is imposed. The estimated coeﬃcients are (Table 6a in Lindé
[13], non-farm business output) are shown in table I.1.
45 This p-value was obtained by simulating the above inflation equation 1000 times and ranking the sum of
coeﬃcients from the unrestricted Phillips curve estimated from the actual data (i.e., 0.969) in the set of unrestricted
sums estimated from the simulated data. This is in the spirit of Rudebusch [A5]. For comparison, the simple t -test
gives a p-value of 0.42.
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Table I.1
ωf γ βf βr βy1 βy2 βy3
0.457
(0.065)
0.048
(0.007)
0.425
(0.027)
0.156
(0.016)
1.310
(0.174)
− 0.229
(0.279)
− 0.011
(0.037)
For simplicity, I set βy1 = 1, βy2 = βy3 = βy4 = 0. Then the state-space form can be written as
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
πt
yt
it
zπ,t+1
zy,t+1
ωfπt+1|t
βrπt+1|t + βfyt+1|t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
− (1− ωf ) 0 0 − 1 0 1 − γ
0 − (1− βf ) 0 0 − 1 0 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
πt−1
yt−1
it−1
zπt
zyt
πt
yt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
0
1
0
0
0
βr
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
it +
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
0
0
zπ,t+1
zy,t+1
0
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
The predetermined variables are πt−1, yt−1, it−1, zπt, and zyt, and the forward-looking variables
are πt and yt.
For a loss function (5.3) with δ = 1, λ = 1, and ν = 0.2, and the case where zt is an iid zero-
mean shock; the optimal reaction function (2.21) is (the coeﬃcients are rounded to two decimal
points),
it = 0.58πt−1 + 0.80 yt−1 + 0.41 it−1 + 1.06 zπt + 1.38 zyt + 0.02Ξπ,t−1,t−1 + 0.20Ξy,t−1,t−1,
where Ξπ,t−1,t−1 and Ξy,t−1,t−1 are the Lagrange multipliers for the two equations for the forward-
looking variables in the decision problem in period t− 1.
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